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The quest for a 





The efforts to incorporate the 'social dimen-
sion' into development policy or to formulate 
alternative styles of development are cons-
trained not only by suppositions concerning 
the rationality and benevolence of govern-
ments and their accessibility to generalized 
advice but also by the feasibility of offering 
practical prescriptions for development with-
out prior agreement on a theory of societal 
change. 
On the basis of an analysis of the project 
on a unified approach carried out under the 
auspices of the United Nations Research Ins-
titute for Social Development and CEPAL, 
the author examines the different criteria 
used to approach these issues —technocratic 
or participation i s t, universalist or partiou-
larist, etc.— and after rejecting the idea of a 
universal action model for development, pur-
porting to be suitable for all types of develop-
ing countries, he suggests that there is a need 
for a flexible attitude to development and the 
application of minimum criteria of acceptabil-
ity and viability to the internal and external 
situations of the countries. 
Finally, the author outlines a series of di-
lemmas and challenges for future poliey-ori-
en ted research and notes that if this is to make 
a real contribution to human welfare it must 
maintain a critical attitude to its own terms of 
reference and the suppositions underlying 
them. 
•Consultant to CEPAL. 
The setting of the 'unified 
approach' project 
In February 1971 a team organized jointly by 
the United Nations Research Institute for So-
cial Development (UNRISD), the Economic 
Commission for Latin America (CEPAL), and 
the Social Development Division of the United 
Nations Headquarters Secretariat met in Ge-
neva to plan a project in search of a "unified 
approach to development analysis and plan-
ning", with a scheduled duration of some eigh-
teen months. Resolutions approved the pre-
vious year by the United Nations Economic 
and Social Council and General Assembly 
specified the kind of social-justice-oriented 
development to be sought. 
It is hardly surprising that the team did 
not produce a 'unified approach' meeting the 
specifications of the resolutions during its life 
span or that subsequent efforts by UNRISD 
staff have not been able to synthesize such an 
approach from the materials it left behind. As 
the decade of the 1970s nears its end the short-
comings of current development processes 
and policies are even more conspicuous than 
at its beginning, and the range of contradictory 
attributes demanding 'unification' has wide-
ned: the reconciliation of technocratic ra-
tionality with popular participation, of conti-
nually expanding production with protection 
of the human environment and resource en-
dowment, of continually diversifying human 
wants with priority to the satisfaction of basic 
human needs poses questions that may be 
somewhat clearer than before, but that are as 
far as ever from plausible answers. The unified 
approach project has been one among many 
attempts to grapple with this recalcitrant real-
ity. In some respects, it has been left behind 
by other explorations commanding larger re-
sources and starting from more radical chal-
lenges to the conventional wisdom of develop-
ment . 
Nevertheless, the unified approach pro-
ject helped to incubate ideas and slogans that 
continue to evolve and ramify in sometimes 
unexpected ways in the international organiza-
tions and in different regional and national set-
tings. It may be useful to take a critical look at 
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its history, not as a source of developmental 
prescriptions but as a source of insights into 
the ways in which the quest for such prescrip-
tions has been and is being pursued in the in-
ternational organizations; at the ideological 
preconceptions and bureaucratic rituals shap-
ing this pursuit; at the disciplinary and theo-
retical positions that converge and seek com-
promises (or ignore each other) in a team such 
as that undertaking the project; and at the in-
teractions, if any, between initiatives of this 
kind and the evolution of public policy and 
public opinion. 
In the quest for means of bringing the hu-
man future into closer correspondence with 
professed values there has been a tendency to 
substitute terminological innovation for con-
ceptual innovation, to reinvent 'practical' solu-
tions that have long been current, and to evade 
definitions that would reveal lack of consensus 
on the present nature of human societies and 
on the nature of the Good Society that is 
sought. These traits derive from the constraints 
under which the quest is conducted, particu-
larly within the international organizations, 
and from the role of development research as 
an employment-providing industry that en-
courages its practitioners to attempt a judi-
cious mixture of innovativeness with conform-
ity. The traits are too intimately related to the 
very processes of conflictive change and mask-
ed pursuit of perceived group interests that 
shape 'development ' in the real world to be 
controlled simply through exposure; in any 
case, an underground literature of jokes and 
verses circulating among development prac-
titioners continually does this. Nevertheless, a 
historical-critical survey of the quest for a 
unified approach may contribute some useful 
correctives, particularly because the team un-
dertaking the project struggled against the dif-
ferent forms of evasion and explicitly recogn-
ized them. 
The publication by the United Nations in 
1952 of the Preliminary Report on the World 
Social Situation is a convenient starting point 
for a sketch of the pFe-history of the unified ap-
proach. It goes without saying that such a 
sketch ignores many parallel or overlapping 
initiatives within and without the United Na-
tions family of organizations. The United Na-
tions resolutions calling for the preparation of 
this report assumed that the "world social si-
tuation" was a definable reality that could be 
studied and reported on like the "world eco-
nomic situation", already the subject of annual 
United Nations reports.1 However, the resolu-
tions left impl icit the content and boundaries of 
the "social situation". 
The small Secretariat teams charged with 
preparation of the report could not start from a 
unifying concept of its subject: it was con-
fronted with scanty and unrealiable informa-
tion for most of the world relating to an unma-
nageably wide range of questions that might 
be considered 'social', political pitfalls de-
riving from the Cold War and the incipient 
processes of decolonization, and bureaucratic 
pitfalls deriving from the compartmentaliza-
tion of 'social' activities between agencies and 
between units within agencies that was al-
ready a feature of the United Nations system. 
It therefore sought a manageably modest inter-
pretation of its terms of reference: the report 
would focus on "existing social conditions", 
dealing only incidentally with "programmes 
to improve those conditions". The 'social con-
ditions' with which it would deal were to be 
practically synonymous with 'standards of liv-
ing'; it would assess these as far as practicable 
through quantitative indicators. The subject 
matter was to be broken down into 'social sec-
tors', or 'components' of the standard of living, 
delimited in practice by the jurisdictional 
boundaries of the United Nations agencies 
dealing with these sectors and generally con-
tributing chapters on them. In order to com-
pensate to some extent for the resulting com-
partmentalization by sectors and worldwide 
generalizations by sectors, in which the 'social' 
unavoidably became divorced from reference 
to specific societies, the report contained 
chapters on three of the world regions then 
beginning to be labelled 'underdeveloped': 
Latin America, the Middle East, and South 
and Southeast Asia. 
Resolut ions on social questions have usually origin-
ated in the Social Commission (later renamed Commis-
sion for Social Development), an advisory body to the 
Economic and Social Council, and have then been con-
firmed, with or without modifications, in resolutions of 
ECOSOC and finally of the United Nations General As-
sembly. 
ELUSIVE DEVELOPMENT / Marshall Wolfe 9 
The United Nations organs that had re-
quested the report received it quite favour-
ably. It dispelled previous doubts whether 
such a task could be carried to a coherent con-
clusion, achieved an outside reception unusual 
among United Nations publications, and orig-
inated a series of studies in which successive 
attempts to go beyond the self-imposed limita-
tions of the Preliminary Report can be traced. 
These efforts had a good deal to do with the 
way in which the 'unified approach' was even-
tually conceived and pursued. They were part 
of a conflictive evolution of ideas and organi-
zational patterns in the United Nations Secre-
tariat that reflected wider controversies under 
way in other international agencies, univer-
sities, research institutes, and national govern-
ments. Personalities, struggles for survival and 
growth among bureaucratic entities, and ste-
reotypes harboured by each of the parties con-
cerning the others, to be sure, blurred or dis-
torted the reflection, but in very simplified 
terms, three main positions can be distin-
guished. 
On the one side were the economists who 
dominated the authorized version of develop-
ment thinking in the United Nations. They 
were econometrically trained and wedded to 
quantifiable laws and models, and some of 
them saw no reason to take the 'social' into 
account on any terms. Others saw allocations to 
consumption and to certain social services as 
important means of raising the productivity of 
the labour force. Still others were convinced 
that human welfare and equity, the values justi-
fying the development effort, required some 
immediate attention to redistributive mea-
sures. However, they could come to terms with 
the social only through quantification of a kind 
compatible with their own techniques of draw-
ing up national accounts, constructing models, 
analysing costs and benefits, calculating pro-
duction functions, etc. If the proponents of so-
cial policies wanted a hearing they must learn 
the same techniques and provide usable data 
for them. Their view was that sound develop-
ment policies, made possible by quantification 
of all the relevant factors, would eventually 
benefit everyone; enlightened self-interest 
would make governments and other societal 
actors adhere to them. 
On the other side were proponents of sec-
toral social activities, dominated in the 1950s 
by the experience of the United States, then at 
the height of self-confidence as dispenser of 
advice and aid to poor or war-devastated coun-
tries. The activities in question were directed 
towards the relief of poverty, the universali-
zation of the basic public social services found 
in the industrialized countries, the stimulation 
of community initiative, and the propagation of 
the norms and techniques of the 'helping pro-
fessions', in particular social work. The propo-
nents took the position that the forms of social 
action with which they identified were basic 
human rights and that the norms and tech-
niques, with secondary adaptations, would be 
suitable to peoples everywhere. If local re-
sources were insufficient, external aid and 
training could fill the gap. They were as insen-
sitive as the economists to questions of social 
structural change and power relationships, but 
were particularly insensitive to one question 
central to the latter, that of criteria for the allo-
cation of scarce resources. 
The team responsible for the Reports on 
the World Social Situation found itself in the 
middle, seeking to understand the preoccupa-
tions of the economic quantifiers and the social 
service specialists and to build bridges be-
tween them: increasingly skeptical concerning 
the pretensions of both, but inhibited in criti-
cism by lack of an alternative frame of reference 
and by the Secretariat's distaste for internal 
polemics and 'trouble'. 
In their work, the term 'social develop-
ment' gradually pushed aside 'social situation' 
with its static connotations, and although it did 
not receive a more precise definition, it became 
current as a counterpart to 'economic develop-
ment'. Its users at this time identified it mainly 
with measurable improvement in standards or 
levels of living (the former term referring to 
norms, the latter to realities) and with govern-
ment actions directed to this end. Two Interna-
tional Surveys of Programmes of Social Devel-
opment concentrating on government plans 
and policies were issued, in 1955 and 1959. 
Afterwards, successive Reports on the World 
Social Situation were mandated to include 
"programmes to improve conditions". 
From the beginning the reports en-
croached on topics to which the economists 
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could lay a claim, particularly in relation to 
criteria for the size of allocations to social pro-
grammes and the tension between capital ac-
cumulation and immediate raising of levels of 
living. Soon the reports began to discuss the 
social impact of economic phenomena and 
vice-versa and the social justifications of eco-
nomic programmes and vice-versa. 
The reports of the 1950s maintained a tone 
of qualified optimism. The 'social situation* 
was continually improving according to the sta-
tistical indicators, although the improvement 
was unevenly distributed and "much remains 
to be done". Governments were continually 
introducing new and improved social pro-
grammes. Practically all governments, by dif-
ferent paths, were advancing towards similar 
social goals, differentially hampered by misin-
formation, scanty resources, and the shortcom-
ings of the human agents of their purposes. The 
interests of 'developed' and 'underdeveloped' 
countries in a world future of rising levels of 
living were basically harmonious; aid by the 
former to the latter was an important reality, 
however poorly planned and inadequate in ex-
tent. The social policies of all countries offered 
'lessons' deserving study by their neighbours, 
although the flow of applicable lessons, and of 
experts to teach the lessons, might be mainly 
from the developed to the underdeveloped. 
The picture was of a predominantly rational 
and benevolent although highly imperfect 
world order. 
By the early 1960s the reading of the statis-
tical evidence and the evaluation of policies 
were changing significantly, although the con-
ception of social development remained the 
same. The 1965 Report on the World Social 
Situation struck a note that was to be repeated 
with variations up to the present: 
"A picture of painfully slow progress in the 
developing countries emerges at the mid-point 
of the Development Decade. While some sec-
tors of development (especially education) 
have continued to fare better thay others, and 
some countries (and parts of countries) have 
advanced faster than others, it seems clear that, 
for the most part, the recent effort at develop-
ment has fallen far short of hopes and expecta-
tions. Possibly some of these expectations were 
unduly optimistic; a more pertinent question is 
whether the development efforts, both national 
and international, have been sufficient - and in 
the right direction. 
"Progress has been limited both by exter-
nal constraints and by internal political and 
social realities. Unfavourable trends in trade 
and problems of external financing have sharp-
ly limited the material resources for develop-
ment in many of the poorer countries, while the 
implementation of development goals has 
been hampered in a number of these countries 
by political instability and dissensions, with 
frequent overthrow of governments amid 
charges of corruption; sometimes also by lack 
of the necessary political will for development; 
and frequently by persistence of administrative 
and social structures that fail to provide an or-
ganizational basis for change and development 
or to enlist popular motivation and participa-
tion," (p. vii). 
In fact, the proponents of social develop-
ment had begun to envisage development as a 
complex process of societal change and moder-
nization, in which the 'economic' and the 'so-
cial' were separable only artificially and for 
purposes of analysis. However, their distrust of 
global theories and models (or their institution-
al inhibition from choosing any one theory of 
societal change), together with the kinds of in-
formation available to them and the intellectual 
habits generated by the sectoral organization of 
the reports and the negotiation of their contents 
with the bureaucratic guardians of the sectors, 
continually crowded them back into a narrower 
vision of social development made up of pro-
gress in separate components of levels of liv-
ing, measurable through inescapably hetero-
geneous statistical indicators and promotable 
through equally heterogeneous social and eco-
nomic programmes. They became sufficiently 
sensitive to the shakiness of the data base of the 
elaborate statistical manipulations and models 
of the economists not to be tempted to follow 
suit with equally shaky social statistics. They 
considered but rejected as impracticable the 
objective of unifying the concept of level of 
living and measuring 'social development' 
through a composite statistical indicator com-
parable to the national income or gross national 
product. They made some use of the findings of 
sociological and anthropological field research, 
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but found in the theories then current in these 
disciplines no help towards an interpretation of 
social development matching the imposing 
structures built around economic develop-
ment. 
Meanwhile, the idea of objective guide-
lines for allocations of public resources and 
better mutual support between economic and 
social programmes atracted the attention of na-
tional representatives in the deliberative 
bodies of the United Nations. During the 1950s 
various United Nations resolutions called for 
"balanced economic and social development" 
and asked the Secretariat for reports pointing 
the way to such development. The current de-
bate among economists over 'balanced' vs. 'un-
balanced' growth strategies contributed to the 
popularity of the term, although the concep-
tions of what was to be 'balanced' had little in 
common. The resolutions conveyed a vision of 
social and economic 'fields' as distinct realities 
deserving equal shares of fertilizer. 
The interest in 'balance' also had a more 
concrete motivation. The growth of interna-
tional technical assistance to 'under-devel-
oped' countries was confronting the interna-
tional agencies with competition for allocations 
to social and economic programmes compara-
ble to that experienced by the national admi-
nistrations, and the United Nations delibera-
tive bodies had no generally accepted criteria 
for bringing order into the competition. Inter-
national promoters separately urged on the na-
tional administrations a bewildering variety of 
projects and approaches and built up alliances 
with national sectoral interests. At the same 
time, many countries were setting up planning 
agencies, and some of these agencies were re-
ceiving formal responsibilities for centralizing 
technical assistance requests and arbitrating 
between the different sectoral claims for alloca-
tions. It was reasonable to suppose that while 
useful lessons must be emerging from these 
efforts, they would also requiere advances from 
economic development planning techniques to 
something more comprehensive. Thus, one of 
the resolutions called for "...studies of actual 
government experience in integrating social 
programmes with each other and with econom-
ic programmes and in deciding upon size and 
priority of allocations in general development 
plans".2 
The Secretariat team responsible for the 
Reports on the World Social Situation, after 
some years of speaking of'balance' as a desid-
eratum, finally began to tackle the question 
systematically around 1957 and presented its 
conclusions in the 1961 report, which began 
with the statement: 
"From a governmental point of view, the 
question of balanced social and economic de-
velopment is to an important extent a question 
of the pattern of public expenditure. There is 
no over-all conception or theory of balanced 
development applicable to the expenditure po-
licy of the economically underdeveloped coun-
tries at the present time; there are only frag-
ments of a theory and 'common sense'." 
The treatment of the question in the 1961 
report maintained the cautiously empirical 
tone of the above quotation, summarizing a 
wide range of possible interactions between 
the 'social' and the 'economic' and of theories 
concerning such interactions, concluding that 
"while it is theoretically not possible to state 
what levels of development in the various so-
cial components should go with given levels of 
economic development, it is quite possible to 
state what social levels do go with given eco-
nomic levels", and that "studies of actual pat-
terns of development can assist the practical 
process of decision-making... by providing evi-
dence of social levels that can demonstrably be 
achieved at given levels of economic develop-
ment [and] by providing evidence of imbal-
ances", (p. 39). 
Between 1957 and 1964, thirteen "country 
case studies" were completed and issued as 
background documents for the 'balanced de-
velopment' project. Some of these studies were 
confident of the prospects for the national vari-
ant of planning; others exposed consistent fail-
ures on the part of political leaders and plan-
ners to foresee the resources that could be mo-
bilized to achieve their purposes or the wider 
consequences of their efforts. The studies did 
not reveal any readily transferable techniques 
2See Introduction to Planning for Balanced Economic 
and Social Development: Six Country Case Studies 
(United Nations, New York, 1964). 
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for balancing, and confirmed that juxtaposition 
of social and economic programmes in a deve-
lopment plan did not insure either their inte-
gration or their implementation. A good many 
of the studies confirmed implicitly that the size 
of allocations depended on some combination 
of bureaucratic inertia, the relative strength of 
organized pressures, the relative persua-
siveness of advocates, or the hunches of politi-
cal leaders, rather than on technical criteria. 
Moreover, in several of the countries political 
regimes and plans changed radically even be-
fore the Secretariat editors had time to issue the 
study. 
Within the United Nations during the 
1960s at least two distinct approaches pro-
ceeded, if not hand in hand, in juxtaposition 
with the attempts to bring the multifarious acti-
vities relating to human welfare under a roof of 
'social development', measure their progress, 
and balance them with economic activities. 
The more influential of the approaches was the 
elaboration of norms for economic develop-
ment of the Third World, shaped by the kind of 
economic thinking described above and sym-
bolized by the first Development Decade. In-
terest centered on goals for investment, finan-
cial and technical flows from 'developed' to 
'developing* countries, terms of trade, and, as 
the expected result, rates of increase in the 
gross national product. The second and more 
visionary approach was that of formulation of 
normative declarations on social and economic 
rights, and this, undeterred by the chasm be-
tween governmental votes for such rights and 
governmental capacity or will to honour them, 
reached its culmination in the Declaration on 
Social Progress and Development approved by 
the General Assembly in 1969 as resolution 
2542 (XXIV). 
The approaches of development econo-
mists and proponents of social sectoral action 
evolved during the 1960s, although it is doubt-
ful whether they came to understand each 
other much better. The economists became 
more inclined to recognize 'social aspects' and 
'social obstacles' to economic development, at 
least as excuses for frustrated plans and lagging 
dynamism, and to challenge sociologists for 
advice on how to insert missing ingredients 
and remove obstacles.3 They became more in-
terested in the contributions of education and 
health services to the upgrading of'human re-
sources' and tried to devise methods of quan-
tifying such contributions which, it was hoped, 
would permit their incorporation into models 
and plans. Moreover, the dominant econome-
tricians had to take into account more funda-
mental criticisms of the conventional wisdom 
from within the economic camp, in particular 
from Gunnar Myrdal in Asian Drama (1968). 
The social sectoral groups came to look on 
the economists as powerful but narrow-minded 
figures who could ensure adequate attention to 
social concerns by including them in develop-
ment plans, once the right arguments were 
found to enlighten them on the importance of 
these concerns. Thus, somewhat grudgingly, 
some of them entered into the game of calculat-
ing the economic returns on social programmes 
and arguing their efficacy for removal of'social 
obstacles'. They also began to include in their 
reports and resolutions demands that their spe-
cializations should be integrated into planning 
'at the highest level'. 
The first Development Decade drew to a 
close amid disillusionment of several kinds: 
over the tacit refusal of the 'developed' coun-
tries to act on its recommendations and over the 
consequences for human welfare of the kinds of 
economic growth and modernization that were 
taking place. Overall rates of economic growth 
were not too far from the proclaimed goals and 
neither were the gains in certain 'social' indica-
tors but, as the 1965 Report on the World Social 
Situation had indicated, optimistic interpreta-
tions of the statistics were decreasingly plausi-
3 T h e Economic Commission for Latin America was 
probably the first economically-oriented United Nations 
body to try to incorporate (from the early 1950s) a theoreti-
cal sociological approach into its thinking on economic de-
velopment. This approach, under the intellectual leader-
ship of José Medina Echavarria, gradually escaped from its 
ancillary role of diagnosing social aspects and obstacles and 
led to a quite different kind of development dialogue. See, 
in particular, José Medina Echavarria, Consideraciones so-
ciológicas sobre el desarrollo económico (CEPAL, Santia-
go, Chi le , 1963) and Filosofía, educación y desarrollo (Tex-
tos del ILPES, México City, Siglo XXI, 1967); and Adolfo 
Gurrieri , "José Medina Echavarria: An intellectual pro-
file", CEPAL Review, No. 9, December 1979. 
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ble. The range of future disbenefits and dan-
gers was only beginning to be visible. If what 
was happening was 'development' it was not an 
unmixed blessing, and suspicions that it might 
never become such a blessing were growing 
stronger, even among some development eco-
nomists. 
The disappointing results of the first De-
velopment Decade gave the proponents of the 
various social approaches and of radical 
changes in the economic approaches strong ar-
guments for more adequate attention to their 
concerns in the Strategy to be prepared for a 
second Development Decade. Studies and 
meetings of various kinds began to revolve 
around this objective. 
One manifestation, deriving from the pur-
suit of 'balanced development' and leading di-
rectly to the 'unified approach', was the con-
vening of a Meeting of Experts on Social Policy 
and Planning in Stockholm in September 1969. 
This meeting was an attempt by the proponents 
of a broad but pragmatic conception of social 
development to strengthen their position by 
forming a common front with critical econo-
mists. More than half of the ten experts, se-
lected by the usual criteria of geographical and 
political distribution, were economists who 
had already, in various ways, tried to incorpo-
rate non-economic factors into their thinking. 
One finds in their report, as in all reports of 
meetings of this kind, echoes of voices with 
different preoccupations, theoretical back-
grounds and terminologies.4 The report pays its 
respects to the whole range of sectoral social 
questions by now traditional in the United Na-
tions, in terms differing little from the Reports 
on the World Social Situation. Whether the ex-
perts had anything new to say or not, they could 
not leave themselves open to the accusation of 
neglecting the importance of education, health, 
etc. The more central propositions of the re-
port, however, constitute an interesting de-
monstration of the ways in which the problem 
of rethinking development was generally con-
4The Report of the Meeting of Experts on Social Policy 
and Planning was published in the International Social 
Development Review, No. 3, United Nations, New York, 
1971, pp. 4-14. 
ceived at the time, and shaped the terms of 
reference of the unified approach project. 
"The purpose of the meeting was to clarify 
further the role of social factors in development 
with a view to ensuring their adequate inclu-
sion in development plans and programmes." 
This proposition and the proposition that "the 
economic approach to development analysis 
and planning had to be integrated with a social 
approach that was different in nature and 
would be more relevant to the problems of de-
veloping countries in the coming decade" were 
juxtaposed with less simple formulas: "it is 
most necessary to view the development pro-
cess as a complex whole, comprising economic 
elements sensu stricto, but also other social, as 
well as political and administrative, elements. 
Any design for a development strategy, nation-
al or international, must cover all the above-
mentioned fields if it is to be meaningful, in-
ternally consistent and capable of effective im-
plementation." Governmental and United Na-
tions compartmentalization should give way to 
a "more unified treatment", in which "the idea 
of a single social system in which development 
occurs" should be "taken seriously as its start-
ing point". 
Misleading dividing lines between eco-
nomic and social phenomena, and between 
economic and social development, have been 
"due in part to the rather narrow approach to 
the development process characteristic of past 
thinking in economics, which relied heavily on 
simplistic econometric models with highly 
aggregated variables", and in part to govern-
mental and United Nations bureaucratic com-
partmentalization. An "over-emphasis on eco-
nomic growth rates of production has been 
based on the apparent ease of quantification in 
the concept of the national income or gross 
national product of developing cuntries". "The 
dominance of economists among the social 
scientists, and the earlier development and 
easier quantification of their concepts, has 
meant that certain non-market aspects —those 
unappropriately labelled 'social'— have been 
neglected in approaches to development." The 
experts recommended that those aspects 
should be dealt with as 'neglected areas' rather 
than as 'social factors', but did not follow this 
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recommendation in the remainder of their 
report. 
The report endorsed one version of the 
'dualist' label around which a great deal of 
ideological polemics and semantic confusion 
had focussed during the 1960s: "...a meaning-
ful approach to development planning must 
take account of the dualist structure of many 
developing societies —dualist in terms of the 
difference between modern and traditional 
sectors, differences within those sectors and 
differences between those participating in 
development and those left behind or on the 
margin. ...The fact that development either 
leaves behind, or in some ways even creates, 
large areas of poverty, stagnation, marginality 
and actual exclusion from social and economic 
progress is too obvious and too urgent to be 
overlooked." 
The report came down to earth by singling 
out one broad problem area as central to an 
acceptable development strategy: "The major 
problem for the Second Development Decade 
is likely to be unemployment and under-
employment. ...In the absence of vigorously 
enforced employment policies, the grim pros-
pect of the Second Development Decade is one 
of rising unemployment, accompanied by in-
creasing concentration of the worst aspects of 
poverty in the cities, and growing gaps in the 
level of welfare among social groups and re-
gions in individual countries, as well as 
growing gaps among countries. All this can take 
place with rates of increase in national income 
in most developing countries as high as or 
higher than the rates achieved by the techni-
cally advanced countries during their periods 
of industrialization." 
The report juxtaposes the technocratic vi-
sion of development engineered from the top 
and the participationist vision of development 
emerging from popular initiative, but shows 
more affinity with the former: in the past, the 
analysis of social development processes and 
policies has focussed on "social development 
objectives" and on "social obstacles to devel-
opment". The processes and policies should be 
viewed also "in terms of engineered social 
change... policies could and should be devised 
so as to activate wider social strata to increase 
their participation in the development pro-
cess". A major prerequisite for development is 
"peaceful radical social change, as rapidly as 
possible". "Peaceful domestic movements 
committed to rapid change should be per-
mitted to flourish and, whenever possible, 
should be supported if they would help to pro-
mote a sense of participation and social en-
gagement." However, for the social planner, it 
would be important "to obtain knowledge and 
guidance as to whether... radical changes [in 
attitudes] can be more easily made than a suc-
cession of small changes". 
Finally, "to achieve effective develop-
ment planning, all planners should think in 
terms of all goals". 
The above quotations, together with other 
formulations in the report, suggest certain 
papered-over differences between 'experts' as 
to the nature of the 'social', but they also indi-
cate a kind of compromise consensus on cer-
tain key suppositions that had already come 
under question during the 1960s. In miniature, 
they point to a number of conceptual problems 
that were to plague the later quest for a unified 
approach: 
(i) The report assumes that a common pro-
cess identifiable as 'development' is underway 
in the so-called 'developing' countries. This 
process is almost by definition, good and nec-
essary, although its present shortcomings, from 
the standpoint of human welfare, may be more 
easily demonstrable than its goodness. These 
shortcomings can be attributed in large part to 
deficiencies in government policies and these 
in turn to the dominance of economic planners 
with over-narrow conceptions, using inappro-
priate tools. While the report voices many of 
the criticisms of current processes of economic 
growth and dependent modernization that 
were to become more insistent during the 
1970s, it treats these as remediable defects. It 
does not entertain the possibility that the de-
fects are inseparable from the functioning of 
the current international order, or that this 
order is basically incompatible with enhance-
ment of human welfare over the long term. Still 
less does it entertain the possibility that 'devel-
opment' is an inspirational myth, originally 
used to justify the attempted reproduction 
throughout the world of certain patterns for the 
organization of production characteristic of 
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the recent past of parts of Europe and North 
America, then overloaded with additional at-
tributes to reinforce its supposed desirability 
and inevitability. 
(ii) The report (probably in part because of 
the terms of reference of the meeting) places 
unlimited confidence in the potential capacity 
of planners to take everything into account in 
an integrated fashion and reveal to policy 
makers the one best way to do whatever they 
want to do. It assumes that development can be 
largely what planners and policy makers make 
of it, and that if sufficiently enlightened as to 
the importance of 'social' or neglected factors 
they can make of it something much better than 
heretofore. There is no trace of the various old 
and new disciplinary and theoretical positions 
that were questioning human capacity to plan 
comprehensively so as to reach predetermined 
ends and were (sometimes) finding reasons for 
moderate optimism in the market, in the 
'hiding hand' stimulating would-be change 
agents by concealing difficulties from them, in 
the interplay of democratic political institu-
tions, or in the acceptance and informed manip-
ulation of 'limited rationality' in bureaucratic 
organizations. 
(iii) The report does not entertain the pos-
sibility that the international organizations and 
governments to which it addresses itself, de-
riving from the power structures responsible 
for the iniquities to which it points, might be 
neither able nor willing to undertake radical 
changes, and that, indeed, they might look on 
their own requests for such reports as a harm-
less ritual testifying to their good intentions. 
The report refers to the inadequacies of govern-
ments only in terms of Gunnar Myrdal's con-
cept of the 'soft State' with "insufficient power 
or will to carry out a number of desirable pol-
icies", and implicitly supposes that a 'hard 
State' could have such power and will. Gov-
ernments advised by the right kind of planners 
are supposed to promote rapid and radical but 
peaceful social change and are entitled to per-
mit or support social movements according to 
their informed judgement of the movement's 
peacefulness and its potential helpfulness in 
promoting "a sense of participation and wider 
social engagement". "Participation in the de-
velopment process" of "wider social strata" is 
to be achieved through policies of "engineered 
social change". From the vantage point of the 
end of the 1970s this faith in the rational be-
nevolence of hard States engineering peaceful 
radical social change so as to enable the "wider 
strata" to participate in a development process, 
whose adaptability to meeting their needs in-
stead of excluding or exploiting them is taken 
for granted, seems the most ingenuous aspect 
of the report. In the context of the end of the 
1960s, however, it constituted a cautious rec-
ognition, tailored to the intended public of the 
report, of the revolutionary criticisms of exist-
ing social and political structures that were 
then arising on all sides. 
The United Nations Economic and Social 
Council and General Assembly approved the 
report of the experts in 1970 and decanted 
it into resolutions giving instructions to the 
Secretariat for further work.5 These resolutions 
affirmed "the need for a unified approach to 
development analysis and planning which 
would fully integrate the economic and social 
components in the formulation of policies and 
programmes at the national and international 
levels". They laid down specifications, de-
riving from the report of the experts, for the 
kind of'unified approach" wanted, which, they 
said, must "include components" designed: 
"(a) To leave no section of the population 
outside the scope of change and development, 
(b) To effect structural change which 
favours national development and to activate 
all sectors of the population to participate in the 
development process, 
(c) To aim at social equity, including the 
achievement of an equitable distribution of 
income and wealth in the nation, 
(d) To give high priority to the develop-
ment of the human potentials, including voca-
tional technical training and the provision of 
employment opportunities and meeting the 
needs of children." 
The above components are to be "borne in 
mind in development analysis and planning 
processes, as well as in their implications, ac-
cording to the particular developmental needs 
5The International Social Development Review, No. 
3,1971, contains the text of these resolutions. 
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of each country". The Secretary-General is to 
submit a report on the unified approach at the 
"earliest possible date". The General Assem-
bly resolution, more specifically, requests him 
to "evolve methods and techniques for the ap-
plication of a unified approach to development, 
to be put at the disposal of Governments at their 
request". 
During the same year, the General Assem-
bly approved an "International Development 
Strategy" for the Second Development Decade 
(the 1970s). The Strategy was prepared mainly 
by the United Nations Committee for Devel-
opment Planning, a permanent advisory body 
composed of eminent economists set up in 
1966, whose preliminary work for the Strategy 
had been criticized in the report of the social 
policy experts as insufficientíy human-welfare-
oriented. The report of the experts was appar-
ently not brought to the attention of the Com-
mittee for Development Planning, for what-
ever reason. Thus, the 'unified approach' reso-
lution and the Strategy reached and passed 
through the General Assembly by separate 
channels. The Strategy, like its predecessor, 
The preceding pages have suggested certain 
methodological and institutional constraints in 
efforts by United Nations bodies to deal with 
the 'social' or with 'development': 
(i) The problem to be studied was normal-
ly defined through a resolution deriving partly 
from past reports presented by the Secretariat 
and partly from the interest and points of view 
of the representatives of governments in the 
policy-making bodies. In practice, govern-
ments rarely tried to impose a coherent ideol-
ogical formulation through their representa-
tives; they were generally content to seek rec-
ognition of their own achievements, refute crit-
icisms, and occasionally score off adversaries. 
In the case of the 'social', which was more or 
less marginal to the central preoccupations of 
the governments, the formulation of problems 
devoted most of its content to targets for eco-
nomic growth, trade and financial transfers. 
However, the spirit of the times ensured that it 
would find room not only for a series of conven-
tional and vague social sectoral recommenda-
tions ("developing countries will make vigor-
ous efforts to improve..., will adopt suitable 
national policies..., will take steps to pro-
vide...", etc.) but also an affirmation of the need 
for a unified approach somewhat stronger than 
that of the resolutions deriving from the ex-
perts' report: 
"...qualitative and structural changes in 
the society must go hand in hand with rapid 
economic growth, and existing disparities 
—regional, sectoral and social— should be 
substantially reduced. These objectives are 
both determining factors and end-results of de-
velopment; they should therefore be viewed as 
integrated parts of the same dynamic process, 
and would require a unified approach." 
The 'unified approach' had thus followed 
'balanced development' into the international 
repertoire of aspirations that might mean many 
things to different men. 
by the Secretariat, modified by personal inter-
ests and opinions of some representatives, 
usually prevailed, as long as it was clear that 
such formulations did not commit the govern-
ments or the United Nations to additional ex-
penditures. 
(ii) Definition of the problem normally 
preceded a request to the Secretary-General, as 
the person ultimately responsible for the work 
of the social units of the Secretariat, to produce 
a report containing 'practical' recommenda-
tions within a fixed period, determined by the 
calendar of future meetings of the policy-
making bodies and by the need to allow ample 
time for prior translation and distribution of 
documents. During the 1970s timetables were 
also increasingly influenced by provisions for 
periodic review and appraisal of progress 
II 
Methodological and institutional constraints 
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within the Second Development Decade and 
by the international 'years' focussed on broad 
social problems. The practical recommenda-
tions were to be addressed to governments, on 
the supposition that they would be willing and 
able to act on prescriptions couched in very 
general terms. The conventions of the exer-
cises permitted considerable latitude in criti-
cism of 'some governments', 'many govern-
ments', etc. as inefficient, corrupt, short-
sighted, or compartmentalized, as long as these 
traits were treated as shortcomings remediable 
through good advice and countries were not 
identified. Hypotheses that the problems ad-
dressed were not of a nature to be solved by the 
planning and actions of governments of what-
ever kind, or that typical existing governments 
would be unable to respond appropriately be-
cause of the character and the objectives of the 
forces dominating them were ruled outa priori. 
(iii) Research techniques, beyond the 
compilation and synthesis of available pub-
lished information, followed a limited range of 
paths, usually specified in the governing reso-
lution: 
(a) A questionnaire might be circulated to 
governments asking for their views on the 
problem and their methods of dealing with it. 
This technique has been used in earlier stages 
of social policy studies, and was resorted to 
again later in the quest for 'practical applica-
tions' of the unified approach, but did not enter 
into the work deriving immediately from the 
1970 resolutions. The use of questionnaires 
had the advantage of freeing the Secretariat 
from responsibility for producing solutions to 
the more controversial questions, but had the 
disadvantage of eliciting incorrigibly hetero-
geneous materials, generally from a small mi-
nority of member governments, that had some-
how to be 'taken into account' in reports. 
(b) 'Country case studies' might be pre-
pared through national institutions, individual 
consultants, or members of the Secretariat. 
This technique offered a greater likelihood of 
obtaining fresh information and ideas in a rela-
tively coherent form. However, the conven-
tions demanded that the countries to be studied 
be selected for a maximum of geographical and 
political diversity, and selection depended on 
too many extraneous factors to permit clear def-
inition of what the 'cases' were supposed to 
demonstrate. Budgetary limitations and short 
deadlines (since the case studies were gener-
ally supposed to contribute to reports due with-
in less than two years) restricted the selection 
of those responsible for carrying them out and 
hampered the consultations and revisions 
needed for comparability and critical analysis. 
Typically, the reports made only slight use of 
the country case studies because they were 
completed after the deadline, because changes 
in the circumstances of the country left them 
quickly out of date, or because they presented 
an unassimilable mass of detail. 
(c) The governing resolution usually en-
visaged consultations with and contributions 
from appropriate specialized agencies and 
other units of the United Nations family having 
social responsibilities (ILO, FAO, UNESCO, 
WHO, UNICEF, etc.). The consultations might 
or might not be perfunctory, but overlapping 
jurisdictions and sensitivity to criticism of 
certain dogmas and programmes introduced 
additional inhibitions into the preparation of 
broad, ideally 'unified' reports. 
(d) At some stage in the response to re-
quests for reports and recommendations, a 
'meeting of experts' was practically obligatory. 
The conventions demanded that the Secre-
tariat select the experts, like the countries for 
case studies, for maximum diversity, within 
limits imposed by the Secretariat's contacts and 
information concerning their qualifications 
and availability. In relation to broad topics such 
as social policy, balanced development, or the 
unified approach, the term 'expert' was stretch-
ed far beyond its usual sense. The partici-
pants in meetings might be 'experts' in many 
relevant specializations, but hardly in a field 
yet to be explored and mapped. As time went 
on and meetings multiplied, the repeated par-
ticipation of planners and scholars undoubt-
edly contributed to a common understanding 
that has flowered in the formulations of 'an-
other development' during the 1970s. The role 
of the 'experts' supposed to evaluate and im-
prove ideas presented by the Secretariat, how-
ever, was ambiguous. If the experts exercised it 
vigorously they exposed their own differences 
of background and viewpoint and complicated 
the Secretariat's task of producing a coherent 
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'practical' report. The more deeply an expert 
was committed to a comprehensive theory or 
strategy of his own, the less fitted he would be 
to enter into an unavoidably eclectic exercise. 
In combination, the instructions and tech-
niques here outlined seemed to rule out the 
selection or construction of a single theory of 
social change on which to base an integrated 
strategy for social development. The instruc-
tions and techniques ensured that heteroge-
neous, incomplete, and erratically selected 
information would have to be taken into ac-
count; that representatives of different points 
of view and different terminologies would have 
to reach a least common denominator, or that 
their report would have to incorporate all pro-
posals not definitely unacceptable to other par-
ticipants nor self-evidently incompatible. 
Once a grant from the Netherlands (later 
supplemented by grants from Canada and 
Sweden) made it possible to undertake such a 
study outside the routine of periodic world 
social reports, it was decided in New York to 
centre the study of a "unified approach to 
development analysis and planning" in the 
United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development (UNRISD), an institution less 
bound by constraints and conventions than the 
Secretariat itself, but with a staff and work 
programme deriving historically from the con-
cepts of level of living, social development and 
balanced development that had evolved in the 
Secretariat, and accustomed to similar research 
methods, in particular the pursuit of informa-
tion on broad topics through country case 
studies. 
The core of the research team that first met 
in February 1971 and engaged in discussions of 
preliminary drafts and conceptual papers 
during the greater part of that year was made up 
of the Director of UNRISD, who had taken a 
leading part in the evolution of United Nations 
thinking since the Preliminary Report on the 
World Social Situation; the Chief of the Social 
Development Division of the Economic Com-
mission for Latin America, where more politi-
cally-oriented and conflict-oriented lines of 
thinking had been pursued for some time; an 
economist with experience in the plan organi-
zation of France and in the study of develop-
ment indicators; a specialist in the study of 
decision-making processes; and an economist 
who had written extensively on development 
and served as a policy and planning consultant 
in different parts of the world. Other persons 
joined the team during the course of the year, 
contributed conceptual papers, or entered into 
discussions with the team: directors of national 
planning agencies, consultants on develop-
ment planning, members of the United Nations 
Committee for Development Planning, spe-
cialists in regional planning, in human geo-
graphy, in econometric techniques, etc. Their 
function was to cover questions outside the 
competence of the core team but relevant to a 
'unified approach'. 
Even the core members of the team had 
other responsibilities in the Secretariat, in 
other UNRISD research projects, in academic 
institutions, and as national development 
planners and consultants. It was evident from 
the beginning that a team of this kind, with less 
than two years at its disposal, would not be able 
to reach a theoretical consensus nor produce a 
comprehensive set of prescriptions for unified 
development within that time. Instead, the 
team entertained the more modest hope of 
reaching agreement on certain central con-
cepts, clarifying theoretical or disciplinary 
sources of divergence on others, stimulating 
new ways of thinking about development, and 
producing two kinds of report: first, a synthesis 
of central issues and unifying concepts, along 
with a few cautiously 'practical' guidelines, 
and second, a report covering in some detail all 
the aspects the team considered relevant and 
important, in chapters to be written by indi-
vidual team members and consultants, re-
flecting their different points of view but given 
a reasonable coherence through discussions 
with the team as a whole. 
The deadline for the first report was Octo-
ber 1972, this date being determined by the 
need to submit a report of the next session of 
the Commissionn for Social Development. The 
deadline for the second report was relatively 
elastic, but it was hoped that it would be com-
pleted by the end of 1973. 
In practice, budgetary limitations and 
other commitments of the team members made 
it impossible to continue beyond 1971 the dia-
logue that had begun, and the texts that 
ELUSIVE DEVELOPMENT / Marshall Wolfe 19 
emerged remained too diverse in their ap-
proaches' as well as their styles tq add up to a 
publishable second consolidated report. In 
later stages, a series of individuals struggled to 
impose order on a mounting accumulation of 
disparate materials. 
The team devoted a good deal of attention 
during 1971 to plans and negotiations for a 
series of studies of national experience, and 
eight such studies were eventually completed 
by national institutions or consultants, al-
though only one of them was ready by the in-
tended deadline of May 1972, so that they 
could be used only in a very limited way in 
preparation of the project's first or preliminary 
report. UNRISD eventually issued five of them 
in mimeographed texts. The specifications for 
the studies gave those carrying them out con-
siderable latitude for pursuing aspects they 
considered nationally important, but sought a 
measure of uniformity by asking them to dis-
cuss the relevance to their national situations of 
certain preliminary hypotheses of the project, 
in particular, that of the emergence of a "triple 
crisis" in development planning: namely, in 
the basic philosophy or final goals of such 
planning, in its links with policy formation and 
decision-taking, and in the adequacy of its 
techniques, mostly of economic origin. Half the 
studies were carried out by economists, who 
were often the only candidates prepared to take 
a global view of what was happening in their 
countries in the name of development. 
In spite of the small number of studies, 
the differences in their content and in the ap-
proaches of those carrying them out deserve 
some attention as indications of differences in 
the real world of national societies to which the 
quest for a unified approach addressed itself. 
Two of the studies dealt with Asian coun-
tries (Philippines and Sri Lanka) which had 
extensive and bureaucratized social program-
mes, formal planning mechanisms and compet-
itive party politics, with social service, con-
sumption subsidy, job creation, and public 
works accomplishments and promises critical 
to party sucess in periodic elections. These 
studies were carried out collectively by institu-
tions —a university school of public adminis-
tration and a private socio-economic research 
institute staffed largely by persons having 
previous experience in the national planning 
system. They documented in detail the func-
tioning of programmes and the deficiencies of 
co-ordination and overall policy guidance. 
Under conditions of political competition for 
limited objectives, bureaucratic compart-
mentalization of social and economic activities, 
and diffuse dissatisfaction at the malfunc-
tioning of the system, but with no immediate 
prospect of major changes in the distribution of 
power and the expectations of different inter-
est-groups in the societies, these studies could 
make various practical suggestions for im-
provements in policy formation and execution, 
but offered no hope of a radically different 
'unified approach*. Both texts indicated that the 
contradictions in the functioning of the so-
cieties were likely to become more pro-
nounced in the future but that the deterioration 
probably would not overcome their basic sta-
bility for a long time. Meanwhile, planners had 
to try to understand political realities, adapt 
their proposals to such realities, and help to 
educate political leaders and public opinion. 
One study dealt with another Asian coun-
try, Iran, that was undergoing rapid moderniza-
tion under autocratic leadership, with re-
sources at its command vasdy larger than those 
of most 'developing' countries, with formal 
planning machinery, but without open chan-
nels for the competition of interest groups and 
political movements. This study was carried 
out by a political scientist in contact with the 
plan organization. Its dominant note was in-
tense frustation of several kinds: first, at the 
high social costs and inequity of the moderniza-
tion process; second, at the limited and erratic 
use made by the 'patrimonial ruler' of the ad-
vice of technocrats and planners; third, at the 
precariousness of societal stability resting on 
minorities only 'cynically committed' to the 
system, with the majority excluded and resent-
ful. Here a certain unification of policy was 
present at the top and bureaucratic, political, 
and financial constraints were less formidable, 
but the human welfare objectives of the unified 
approach did not have first priority, socially-
oriented planning could not depend on a 
hearing, and transmission channels between 
the leadership and the society functioned 
poorly. 
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Two studies were carried out by individual 
economists on newly independent African 
countries (Kenya and Togo) with formal plan-
ning machinery inherited in part from the colo-
nial past and in process of adaptation to new 
policy objectives, with political competition 
open but not intense. Here the note is one of 
cautious down-to-earth optimism: while policy 
formation has been erratic and planning has not 
been very effective owing to poor information, 
faulty administrative machinery, and scanty re-
sources, nevertheless gradual improvement in 
planning, adjusted to the capacities of the State 
offers a good deal of hope as a means of making 
policy more coherent and more equitable. A 
radically different and ambitious unified ap-
proach, however, is hardly advisable and prob-
ably impracticable because of its demands on 
information and scarce qualified human re-
sources. A study, also carried out by an econ-
omist, of Trinidad and Tobago in the Caribbean 
sub-region likewise focussed on the modest 
potentialities of planning as a force for rational-
ization in a very small country emerging from 
colonialism with an excess of bureaucracy, in-
tense factionalism, and no clear political vision 
of the national future. 
Two studies, carried out by individual po-
litical scientists, dealt with Latin American 
countries (Chile and Peru) that were then ex-
periencing semi-revolutionary changes (since 
frustrated) within settings of considerable un-
certainty concerning the real distribution of 
power and the capacity of the political regimes 
to transform the system of production and the 
distribution of incomes, wealth and consump-
tion while simultaneously presiding over the 
emergence of new forms of political participa-
tion of the 'marginalized' masses. These 
studies described the national planning me-
chanisms and the current social and economic 
programmes, but their attention lay elsewhere. 
Unlike the other studies mentioned above they 
could not treat the political and economic sys-
tems and the distribution of power as constant 
constraints on policy and planning, for better or 
worse. In Chile and Peru initiatives were 
under way (under the quite different auspices 
of a mainly Marxist-Socialist coalition of politi-
cal parties and of a nationalist military govern-
ment) to transform the systems and structures, 
against the opposition of other combinations of 
forces. Under these conditions, the problems of 
planners seeking to improve their methodol-
ogies and exert more influence over political 
leaders and sectoral bureaucracies receded 
into the background, although both regimes 
were favourably disposed toward planning. 
The questions in the foreground were the 
character, degree of coherence and relative 
strength of the forces supporting and opposing 
structural changes in the control of land, in-
dustry and mineral resources; their tactics and 
ability to mobilize major sectors of the popula-
tion for or against these changes; their ability to 
carry out the changes with a minimum of effi-
ciency under unavoidably conflictive circum-
stances; the possibilities for compromises or 
shifts in political alliances; the compatibility of 
the changes with open political processes and 
the observance of laws generally weighted 
against them; the alternatives for future politi-
cal regimes and forms of popular participation 
if the changes accomplished their immediate 
purpose; and the finding of ways to enlist in-
ternational support and neutralize the opposi-
tion of certain governments and transnational 
enterprises. 
In these studies the differing preoccupa-
tions of the executing institutions and indi-
viduals seem to have coincided with real dif-
ferences in the national situations confronted. 
If the project team had not dispersed by the 
time they were completed, their comparative 
examination could have provided a valuable 
corrective to the normative, universalistic and 
technocratic bias given to the project by its 
terms of reference. They suggested that possi-
bilities for human-welfare-oriented rational-
ization of policy were real but limited; for all 
their differences none of the studies could en-
visage short-term removal of the stumbling 
blocks to a unified approach: more likely, the 
problems would evolve through the interaction 
of political and economic factors into other 
problems, not necessarily less formidable. 
Would-be agents of human-welfare-oriented 
development had to seek opportunities within 
these processes, rather than devise ideal pres-
criptions. 
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III 
Differing approaches to a unified approach 
Two documents set forth the elements of con-
sensus reached in the 'unified approach* proj-
ect while it retained a measure of interdisci-
plinary teamwork: (i) Report on a Unified 
Approach to Development Analysis and Plan-
ning: Preliminary Report of the Secretary-
General (E/CN.5/447), 25 October 1972; this 
report was prepared by one member of the 
team and amplified and revised on the basis of 
comments from other team members, and (ii) 
Report of the Secretary-General on the Expert 
Group Meeting on a Unified Approach to De-
velopment Analysis and Planning held at 
Stockholm from 5 to 10 November 1972. The 
majority of the team members participated in 
this meeting, along with a small number of 
other economists, sociologists, planners and 
representatives of United Nations agencies. 
Both documents were presented to a session of 
the Commission for Social Development in 
February 1973. Because of the Commission's 
deadline the Preliminary Report could not be 
further revised to take into account the com-
ments of the 1972 Expert Group. 
A 'unified approach', according to the 
Preliminary Report "needs to make use oftwo 
complementary ways of looking at develop-
ment: (i) development as a perceived advance 
toward specified ends based on societal values; 
(ii) development as the system of interrelated 
societal changes that underlies and conditions 
the feasibility of the advance". 
"The first sense assumes human capability 
of shaping the future for human ends. It also 
implies that the existing society has the right 
and the ability through general consensus or 
through agents claiming to represent the best 
interest of the society, to make choices and 
enforce sacrifices in the name of development. 
...The second sense assumes that develop-
ment is an intelligible phenomenon suscepti-
ble to diagnosis and to objective propositions 
concerning the inter-relations of factors and the 
probable wider consequences of change in or 
action on key components of the 'system'." 
"From the standpoint adopted here devel-
opment is not a single uniform process or 
dimension of change and it cannot be assumed 
that 'development' means the transformation of 
the countries now labelled 'developing' into 
replicas of countries now labelled 'developed'. 
All national societies will be developing or 
trying to, during the foreseeable future, and at 
the same time will be trying to cope with the 
contradictions and disbenefits that arise from 
their development processes. There is no rea-
son to expect their efforts to lead to uniform 
futures, or to final resolution of their struggles 
in a blessed state of'being developed'." 
The Preliminary Report went on to assert 
that "realistic discussion of the possibilities of 
more rational and effective action by human 
agents requires recognition of the existence 
and unavoidability of different styles, that is, 
different combinations of ends and means ap-
plied to different real patterns of growth and 
change. It also requires the taking into account 
oftwo different kinds oflimitations on styles of 
development —limitations in terms of internal 
coherence and feasibility, and limitations in 
terms of compatibility with human welfare and 
equity values." 
The Preliminary Report distinguished 
between the "real style of development" 
("what is actually happening in a given nation-
al society") and the "preferred style of devel-
opment" ("what the national political leader-
ship, the planning agency, or some other signif-
icant political actor wants or expects to 
happen"). It rejected the possibility of a "de-
tailed universal set of specifications for devel-
opment or particularized 'definition' ", but 
proposed a "minimum criterion" for assess-
ment of styles of development: "the extent to 
which a style of development enables a society 
to function over the long term for the wellbeing 
of all its members". Assessed by this criterion, 
certain styles might be viable but not accept-
able and others acceptable, but not viable. 
The criterion implies choices, explicit or 
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implicit, with regard to: "(i) the extent and 
nature of national autonomy; (ii) the extent and 
nature of popular participation; (iii) the em-
phasis given to production in general, to spe-
cific lines and techniques of production, in-
centives, and forms of control over the means of 
production; (iv) the distribution of the fruits of 
development and mechanisms for redistribu-
tion; (v) ttie encouragement or discouragement 
of specific forms of individual or collective 
consumption of goods and services; (vi) the 
extent and nature of protection of the' human 
environment, and (vii) the extent and nature of 
protection of human relationships contributing 
to solidarity, security, self-realization and free-
dom. These choices are complexly inter-
dependent. If they are mutually contradictory 
beyond a certain point, the style will not be 
viable. If the choices are made in isolation from 
one another the probability is that they will be 
mutually contradictory to a dangerous degree." 
After elaborating on the implications of 
these areas of choice, the Preliminary Report 
proceeded to sketch a typology of real national 
styles of development, then to propose certain 
strategic orientations for policy and certain 
approaches to developmental decision-making 
and diagnosis. 
The differing approaches that we shall 
now discuss emerged not only during the 
period of team activity but also in subsequent 
attempts to synthesize the materials into a 
'unified' final report and in debate outside the 
confines of the project. One might conclude 
that each member of the team began and ended 
with his own 'unified approach', more or less 
compatible with the positions summarized 
above and more or less modified by exposure to 
other positions, but retaining its premises 
deriving from the participant's ideology, dis-
cipline, and previous experience. Menawhile, 
the international scene continually threw up 
additional major problems, approaches and 
slogans. The 1970s saw, instead of progress 
toward consensus on a 'unified approach', a 
continual diversification of interpretations of 
development, continually more ambitious 
international declarations aspiring to reconcile 
them, and also mounting criticism of 'devel-
opment', from several quite different view-
points, as an outworn and misleading myth. 
The following pages do not try to re-
produce the positions of participants in the 
unified approach project. Rather, the intention 
is to use these positions as a springboard to-
wards a discussion of the different approaches 
that have continually confronted one another 
and entered into compromises in the interna-
tional debate, whether as part of the project or 
not. Some of these positions were more 
strongly and typically represented in the 
project than others; a few of them were formu-
lated more explicitly than before during the 
course of the project; some are more ambitious 
and exclusive in their explanatory and opera-
tional claims than others; some are simplified 
versions of positions that the same person 
might emphasize at different times without any 
necessary inconsistency. Some of the partici-
pants whose contributions were most impor-
tant to the measure of consensus achieved in 
the Preliminary Report cannot be identified 
with any of the 'approaches'. All of them are, in 
one way or another, interventionist, the only 
influential approach to development not re-
presented was laissez-faire or reliance on 
market forces. 
1. Development economics re-examined and 
broadened 
This approach assumed the centrality and at 
the same time the insufficiency of economic 
development theories and tools for diagnosis 
and planning applied to market or mixed econ-
omies. Economics offered the closest approx-
imation to a coherent view of development, but 
it had not yet 'taken into account' all the rele-
vant factors. The approach also assumed the 
eentrality of economists as advisers to govern-
ments. The 'unified approach' must therefore 
be presented to economists in terms they could 
accept, incorporate into their methodologies, 
and communicate to political leaders having 
their own preoccupations and limitations of vi-
sion. 
The approach had several main compo-
nents: 
(i) An interest in sociological and psycho-
logical diagnoses of 'social obstacles to deve-
lopment' or 'social preconditions for develop-
ment'. The supposition was that 'traditional' 
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values, attitudes toward work and saving, class 
or caste barriers to mobility, child-rearing prac-
tices, extended family ties, etc. stood in the way 
of a development process requiring acceler-
ated capital accumulation and investment, con-
tinual technological innovation, formation of a 
disciplined and qualified labour force, and pre-
dictable responsiveness of the population to 
market incentives. This development process 
could progress faster and more smoothly once 
the social experts diagnosed the obstacles and 
prescribed ways of removing them. 
(ii) An interest in educational, health, so-
cial security and other social sectoral pro-
grammes, because of their claims on public re-
sources and their contribution to economic de-
velopment through the improvement of 'hu-
man resources'. Quantification of this impact 
and calculation of the ideal size of allocations to 
social programmes were considered key desid-
erata in a unified approach, although difficult 
and perhaps impossible to achieve. 
(iii) A preoccupation with the measurable 
aspects of social justice and improved levels of 
living as the legitimate ends of development. 
The economists in question had already aban-
doned the expectation still current among 
many of their colleagues that these ends would 
eventually and more or less automatically de-
rive from the maximization of investment and 
rates of increase in the national product. The 
most obvious disbenefits of economic growth 
in developing countries were increasing dis-
parities in levels of income and consumption; 
new patterns of impoverishment and insecuri-
ty; and the incapacity of the economies to offer 
productive employment to a large part of the 
labour force. Therefore, the approach affirmed 
employment policies, income redistribution 
policies, and agrarian reform policies to be 
essential components of a unified approach. 
(iv) A preoccupation with the improve-
ment of quantitative methods for reconciling 
multiple objectives and guiding the selection 
of development projects. The proponents of the 
approach felt most at home with quantitative 
methods, and such methods responded to the 
political as well as planning demands made on 
them, but they could not help being aware of 
the fragile factual basis of their calculations. 
Thus they hesitated between the pursuit, on 
the one hand, of continually more elaborate 
and data-demanding techniques for the con-
struction of composite development indicators 
(preferably convertible into monetary terms) 
for complementing the gross national product; 
quantifying improvement in levels and distri-
bution of welfare; calculating 'returns' on so-
cial investments, etc.; and, on die other hand, 
techniques, such as shadow-pricing, which 
permit an ordering and rational choice be-
tween alternative allocations with a minimun 
of data. In the last analysis, quantification 
might function, and be necessary, more as a 
heuristic device or a means of convincing the 
laity than as a reliable reflection of reality. 
During the 1950s and 1960s variants on 
this approach had evolved from a more exclu-
sively econometric position through continual 
discussions in the international agencies and 
elsewhere, as was pointed out above in relation 
to the prehistory of the unified approach. In 
particular, this trend had inspired a series of 
intergovernmental conferences on education 
and development, co-sponsored by UNESCO 
and the regional economic commissions, in 
which national educational authorities and au-
thorities for economic planning and budget 
preparation were brought together with the 
aim of convincing them mutually that educa-
tion should be planned so, as to qualify 'human 
resources' for economic development and that 
education should receive a larger share of pub-
lic expenditures. 
It was an approach that came naturally to 
economists deriving mixed sentiments of 
achievement and frustration from their experi-
ences as development planners and consul-
tants. It was also congenial to many social sec-
toral specialists, in spite of their uneasiness at 
submitting to the predominance of economic 
justifications for social programmes. It gave 
them a means that they lacked of ordering co-
herently what they were doing and also a more 
sympathetic hearing from circles believed to 
have a decisive influence over the allocation of 
resources. 
2. Development planning rehabilitated and 
perfected 
This approach derived from the préoccupa-
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tions of planning practitioners in various 'de-
veloped' countries with market or mixed eco-
nomies and in a much larger number of devel-
oping countries. During the 1950s and early 
1960s the number of countries possessing plan-
ning agencies and preparing fixed-term plans 
has increased manifold. Even governments 
having no interest in such planning for them-
selves began to favour it for the 'developing' 
countries, if only as a means towards more ef-
fective use of their 'aid' to such countries: the 
support by the United States of ten-year eco-
nomic and social development plans as a condi-
tion for aid under the Alliance for Progress is 
the most conspicuous example. The colonial 
powers had also left a heritage of'development 
plans' and some rudimentary planning machin-
ery in many of the newly independent coun-
tries. Courses training 'planners' to fill the 
posts opened in the new planning agencies 
proliferated, and a body of professional plan-
ners with a vested interest in the success of 
planning came into being. In the training of 
these planners economic theories and techni-
ques predominated, but it also included other 
kinds of planning with their own history, in 
particular physical planning associated with 
the disciplines of architecture and engineer-
ing. Educational and health planning began to 
develop as distinct specializations, and in the 
other sectors of social action the acquisition of 
planning techniques and staff of their own be-
gan to figure at least as aspirations. 
While the preoccupations of the planners 
coincided to a large extent with those of the 
development economists described above, 
they were more concerned with the legitimacy 
of their own function, their ties with politics, 
and the nature and effectiveness of the trans-
mission between planning and application. By 
1970, experience had caused a large measure of 
frustration and insecurity to mingle with the 
earlier claims for planning. The relevance of 
formal development plans was beginning to 
seem rather doubtful. The planners could not 
help seeing that their prescriptions were being 
followed only sporadically, and that the results 
of such partial planning deviated widely and 
unpredictably from their objectives and their 
projections. Planners and economic theorists 
had much less influence on the allocation of 
public resources than did alliances of industrial 
and construction enterprises, engineers, and 
politicians, all of them (for differing reasons) 
wedded to large, capital-intensive highly visi-
ble, technologically advanced projects, how-
ever disruptive these might be to the environ-
ment and the livelihood of the people they 
were supposed to benefit. Moreover, in the 
context of radical challenges to power struc-
tures at the end of the 1960s, a good many 
planners could no longer accept the role of neu-
tral technicians at the service of the State be-
hind which they had sheltered themselves 
when planning first began to be institution-
alized. Should they not serve the people rather 
than the State? But if so, how, since the State 
was their employer? 
One reaction was to propose broader and 
more ambitious roles for planning. This ap-
proach dominated Part III of the Preliminary 
Report, which posed the following conditions 
for effective planning: 
(i) "... planning should be a continuous ac-
tivity, that is, an effort at rationality applied to 
various phases of the one process comprising 
the preparation of decision-making, its imple-
mentation, the control over action taken and 
the eventual revision of the orientations 
taken." Planning should not "be confused with 
the periodical elaboration of a document called 
the 'plan'". 
(ii) "The second condition of effective 
planning is the diffusion of planning activities 
in the whole of society. 
... First, planning activities should be ex-
tended to all central government departments 
instead of being confined to a 'Ministry of 
Planning' or 'Office of Planning'. ... Second, 
planning activities should be diffused to other 
administrative levels besides to central govern-
ment." Third, the private sector should be 
drawn actively into planning, with "a recipro-
cal flow of techniques" between private enter-
prise and public sector planning. 
(iii) Planning should be a "diversified but 
coherent activity" involving the co-ordinated 
utilization of financial planning, allocative 
planning, physical or spatial planning and ins-
titutional planning. 
(iv) Planning should function as "part of 
the real decision-making process", and thus 
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should be recognized as apolitical activity. The 
idea that planning is a neutral technical exer-
cise is a myth, although it may be a useful myth 
for planners under some conditions. "Plans al-
ways express choices, models make assump-
tions about what are to be accepted as constants 
(constraints) in the socio-political environ-
ment, values intrude into the choice of means 
as well as ends, techniques such as cost-benefit 
analysis rely on value judgements, and indica-
tors, whether 'economic' or 'social', express ... 
some theory or interpretation of the function-
ing of a society." Ideally, there should be a 
"bringing-together or fusion of training and in-
terests" of decision-maker, administrator and 
planner. 
Effective planning supposes "the diffu-
sion of an attitude or approach of rationality or 
efficiency at all levels of decision-making". It 
supposes a "strategic approach", in which key 
issues are selected for an "intensified planning 
effort", and an "innovative approach" "in the 
definition and organization of resources, the 
kinds of objectives and means chosen and their 
interrelations, in the manner of evaluation and 
execution of programmes and projects and in 
the general orientation of planning offices and 
administrators". 
In fact, this approach seems to envisage a 
future social order in which planning becomes 
an activity and source of guidance as pervasive 
as religion in some other social orders, with 
professional planners functioning as teachers 
and prophets, but with the laity as well conti-
nually learning and applying more compre-
hensive planning techniques and resolving 
their unavoidable conflicts of interests and va-
lues by integrating their plans. 
The next two approaches to be discussed 
implicitly negate this vision of planning soci-
eties, although the vision itself might incorpo-
rate them as legitimate facets of the all-encom-
passing activity of planning. 
3. Pragmatic social and economic ameliorism 
This approach gave priority to the identifica-
tion of policies and measures that have worked 
(in the sense of demonstrably enhancing hu-
man welfare); to the consideration of how they 
might be made to work better; and to pragmatic 
criteria for their combination into mutually 
supportive packages. It derived naturally from 
the 'programmes of social development' side of 
the Reports on the World Social Situation, 
which, in principle, identified programmes 
that were working in the expectation that they 
would provide 'lessons' for the governments of 
other countries confronting similar problems 
(in practice, the information available to the 
compilers of the Reports had been too scanty 
and the political constraints too confining for 
them to state with any confidence whether pro-
grammes they described, mainly summarizing 
official documents, really worked or not). The 
same approach dominated United Nations 
technical assistance in social questions, in 
which 'experts' set forth to apply methods 
learned in their home countries, on the supposi-
tion thay they would be able to adapt such 
methods to the political and social setting of the 
country to be advised (in practice, as often as 
not, the experts really set forth to advocate 
methods that they had never been able to apply 
in their home countries). 
The approach of pragmatic social and eco-
nomic ameliorism had met with harsh and ob-
vious criticisms over the years, but its propo-
nents had plausible arguments on their side. 
After all, throughout the world human-welfare-
oriented and human resource-oriented pro-
grammes of many kinds were continuing to ap-
pear and expand. By now they accounted for 
sizeable shares of public expenditures and of 
the national product in most countries, irre-
spective of their structure and level of produc-
tion, their political system, or their distribution 
of power. Presumably some of them worked 
better than others, and comparative study 
could throw light on the reasons for this and on 
ways of raising the general level of effec-
tiveness. Presumably some rough criteria 
could be established for the kinds as well as the 
amounts of social sector activities appropriate 
to countries at different levels or stages of de-
velopment. Arguments to the effect that such 
improvements could be no more than pallia-
tives in the absence of a unified theory of devel-
opment, or profound structural changes, or a 
transformation of values, or truly comprehen-
sive planning, or social revolution, might be 
excuses of intellectuals for not undertaking the 
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painstaking and unglamorous but necessary ac-
tivities that were within their reach. Great care 
should be taken not to encourage the imper-
missible conclusion that "nothing can be 
done". Wide improvements in education, 
health and other services for the poor majority 
would not only respond to basic needs and 
rights but also make it more feasible for this 
majority to take part in structural or revolution-
ary change. 
It followed that the 'unified approach' pro-
ject, whatever else it might include, should aim 
at a set of practical down-to-earth recommen-
dations that could be applied by the kinds of 
governments present in the real world. It 
should describe the more promising develop-
ment activities and methods of integrating 
them that could be found. It should nor formu-
late over-demanding preconditions and meth-
odologies, and it should nor pursue very far 
lines of thinking about human societies that 
might cast doubt on 'development' as an objec-
tive or on the practicability of a unified ap-
proach to it. As will be noted below, the ap-
proach of pragmatic ameliorism was one of the 
two that persisted in later demands made by 
United Nations policy-making bodies for pur-
suit of a unified approach. 
4. Capacitation of national societies 
This approach emphasized social structural 
change: institutional build-up for diagnosis 
and problem-solving; participatory mecha-
nisms; and educational programmes enabling 
societies to function better through the infor-
med and co-operative action of their members. 
It did not figure in the initial research outline of 
the project. An UNRISD study of decision-
making processes that entered into the scheme 
could have led to it,6 but the methodology of 
this study had a self-contained logic that hinde-
red assimilation. Capacitation emerged in the 
later stages as an alternative to comprehensive 
planning of a society's future and as a comple-
ment to pragmatic social ameliorism. It was 
first given a name in a 1974 report prepared by 
UNRISD.7 
6See J.M. Collette, Etude sur les systèmes de décision 
(UNRISD reportNo. 70.11/1, Geneva, 1970). 
7
 Report on a Unified Approach to Development Anal-
According to this report, "development 
planning first arose in connexion with material 
production ... In the last few decades, planning 
has spread to more and more fields of develop-
ment activity, including social fields, but in this 
process, objectives have become less amenable 
to direct measurement, causal relations have 
become more complex and obscure, and con-
trol of the future has taken on a different com-
plexion". Moreover, "conventional planning 
tends to lead to an over-emphasis on capital 
investment in physical structures and equip-
ment, especially in social fields, since these 
objectives are easier to handle under the meth-
odology of planning (and are likely to be more 
in demand politically) than are various other 
kinds of activity that may be equally or more 
desirable for development and possibly also 
much cheaper". 
Another kind of rational approach to socie-
tal change and development is therefore nee-
ded. "The doctor or the teacher does not make 
plans or blueprints of the future like the archi-
tect but is equally rational. Similarly, at the 
societal level, it is desirable to think in terms of 
a 'capacitating' operation which does not try so 
much to define or control the future as to estab-
lish present conditions or capacities which will 
permit a given society to meet its problems in 
the future. The emphasis in such an approach is 
not on setting future output targets but on 
diagnosing current weaknesses and potentials, 
finding appropriate policies, and constantly 
monitoring the course of development." "An 
example of such a capacitation activity would 
be the undertaking of structural or institutional 
change, which conventional planning does not 
readily deal with through its technical meth-
ods." 
The implications of a 'capacitation ap-
proach' were not further pursued within the 
project, and in its bare bones this approach 
suggests a faith in the existence of some ratio-
nal and benevolent entity qualified or quali-
fiable to direct the capacitation. However, it 
also suggests a conception of development po-
ysis and Planning: Note by the Secretary General 
(E/CN.5/519, 5 December 1974). This report will be dis-
cussed later in this article. 
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licy-making as an educational experience, in 
which societal actors learn to cope by struggl-
ing with problems under conditions of limited 
rationality (an approach applicable to local 
groups and organizations as well as to national 
societies), and this relates it to the position of 
such economists as Albert O. Hirschman and 
such political scientists as Warren F. Ilchman, 
Norman Thomas Uphoff, Michel Crozier and 
Erhard Friedburg.8 This could have been one 
of the most promising paths for exploration by 
the project, if the project had been able to count 
on a longer time span to take advantage of dia-
lectical reactions to the approaches initially 
present ing themselves. 
5. Informational enlightenment 
Lines of thinking present in the Reports on the 
World Social Situation since the 1950s and in 
the UNRISD programme envisaged a trans-
formation of the conditions for public action 
through improved methods of obtaining, dis-
seminating, interpreting and integrating accu-
rate and relevant information for diagnosis of 
social problems and evaluation of progress. 
T h e proponents of social development wanted 
to free their uses of data from domination by 
economic methodologies and construct meth-
odologies better suited to their own purposes. 
They questioned the adequacy of income dis-
tribution studies to throw light on levels of liv-
ing as well as the meaning of national aggregate 
indicators such as the GNP. 
Several complementary suppositions bac-
ked up their emphasis on improvement of in-
formation: first, that one important reason why 
'development ' was so little oriented to human 
welfare was that policy-makers were poorly in-
formed of needs; second, that informational 
exposure of shortcomings could generate pres-
sures forcing governments to act - or make way 
for other regimes that would act. At a more 
8Albert O. Hirschman, Journeys toward Progress: 
Studies of Economic Policy-Making in Latin America 
(1963), Development Projects Observed (1967) and A Bias 
for Hope: Essays on Development and Latin America 
(1971); Warren F. Ilchman and Norman Thomas Uphoff, 
The Political Economy of Change (1969); Michel Crozier 
and Erhard Friedburg, L'acteur et le système (1977). 
modest level of expectation, timely information 
would strengthen the hand of forces within na-
tional governments (as well as international or-
ganizations) disposed to tackle social pro-
blems. These suppositions were clearly legiti-
mate, although they could be qualified by vari-
ous observations: that governments often did 
nothing about problems that had become in-
ternationally notorious; that governments were 
often overwhelmed by informational exposure 
of problems demanding immediate solutions, 
rather than short of information; and that gov-
ernments could use information as an aid to 
repression or a technique for evading action as 
easily as they could use it to promote the gene-
ral welfare. In any case, informational enlight-
enment was the sphere of action most accessi-
ble to the international proponents of social 
development. It would become an 'approach' 
on the level of those discussed above only if it 
were considered a master key to development 
policy. 
Part IV of the Preliminary Report, in deal-
ing with diagnosis, information and indicators, 
for the most part takes too cautious a line to 
justify such a label. It subordinates information 
to the propositions advanced earlier in the Re-
port: "Ideally there should be a continual in-
terplay between diagnosis, redefinition of pre-
ferred styles, and strategic orientations. ...In 
practice, the mutually stimulating relationship 
is less often found than a kind of vicious circle; 
the types of information sought and their uses 
in diagnosis are governed by borrowed, inade-
quate conceptions of style and strategy, while 
conceptions of style and strategy are cramped 
by the types of information used for diagno-
sis....If development is to be understood as an 
in terdependent system of changes rather than 
the expression of a single quantity, then meth-
ods of measurement and quantitative analysis 
appropriate to this conception need to be built 
up . " 
At the same time, the treatment of informa-
tion retained certain propositions common to 
the Reports on the World Social Situation that 
made the possibility of unified policy depend 
on the correct manipulation of information and 
the rejection of certain informational fallacies: 
(i) Development had to be measured in a 
dis aggregative way before being 'unified' in 
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policy. "Diagnosis for unified development in-
volves first an attempt to see if the different 
factors of development are properly covered in 
proper proportions — that some are not ne-
glected, causing a general drag on the system, 
while others are so advanced that their output 
cannot be absorbed." ('Factors' are stated to 
include the conventional components — educa-
tion, health, nutrition, housing, industry, con-
ditions of work and employment, etc. — and 
subcomponents — higher education, secondary 
education, etc. — around which the Reports on 
the World Social Situation had been ordered.). 
While it is impossible to specify simple quanti-
tative requirements of one factor for growth in 
other factors, "through comparative internatio-
nal analysis, normal 'correspondences' among 
social and economic factors at a given level of 
development can be determined. ... Where a 
country shows marked abnormalities ... ques-
tions may be raised about its real style of devel-
opment". Since "development is not a unidi-
mensional phenomenon", what is needed is 
not a single indicator but a "pattern or profile of 
indicators for each country". 
(ii) "Systems for collecting and analysing 
information should be designed as far as possi-
ble to facilitate understanding of relationships 
between different phenomena. This cannot be 
done through aggregates referring to the natio-
nal population as a whole or to large groups. 
Interrelationships can be traced more readily at 
the local or operational level. ... one difficulty 
with most indicators is that they are used as 
national aggregates or averages and fail to re-
flect distribution. Another difficulty is that the 
indicators that seem to make sense at the natio-
nal level may not make much sense when ex-
amined at the local level." "... to understand 
and diagnose the causal relationships between 
different developmental factors it is usually 
necessary to go to the level where the interac-
tions actually take place rather than deal with 
abstractions at the national level." 
Under informational analysis, develop-
ment thus becomes a multidimensional jigsaw 
puzzle, its large pieces divisible into small 
pieces fitting into each other vertically as well 
as horizontally. A unified approach must aim at 
techniques expressing the full complexity of 
their relationships, but they remain pieces with 
distinct contours susceptible to meaningful 
quantitative description, one sufficiently di-
saggregated, and combinable by the well-in-
formed governmental player into a coherent 
whole at the 'national level'. 
6. Institutionalized Marxist socialism and 
far-reaching structural change 
This is the first in the series of approaches un-
der discussion that questioned the possibility 
of development responding to the minimum 
criterion of acceptability and viability within 
the framework of market or mixed economies. 
It did so, however, in a peculiarly ambiguous 
and stereotyped fashion that derived from the 
role of the socialist bloc in the United Nations 
and the ways in which policy-making bodies 
and the Secretariat simultaneously paid re-
spect to and evaded' its ideological position, 
The representatives of the national societies 
identifying themselves as socialist, in which 
the State controlled the means of production 
and the sources of investment and exercised 
power in the name of the working class, as-
serted that these societies could offer lessons in 
a functioning 'unified approach' to the rest of 
the world. The fruits of this unified approach 
were guaranteed full employment, relatively 
even income distribution, and universal ization 
of social security and access to the major social 
services. The preconditions for these achieve-
ments could be labelled 'far-reaching structu-
ral changes', a formula covering many kinds of 
change, such as agrarian reform or popular par-
ticipation in developmental decision-making, 
to which most governments had committed 
themselves through their votes in the United 
Nations. It had to be assumed that governments 
could carry out such structural changes if they 
wanted to, and that they had recognized the 
duty of doing so. The question whether aboli-
tion of private ownership of the means of pro-
duction was not the key structural change could 
be left unanswered. The traditional Marxist-
Leninist hypothesis on the necessity of des-
truction of the bourgeois State and seizure of 
power by the proletariat as a precondition for 
such structural change remained in the shade. 
Its terms of reference and international set-
ting inhibited the unified approach project 
ELUSIVE DEVELOPMENT / Marshall Wolfe 29 
from trying to decide whether socialism (under 
whatever definition) or any other comprehen-
sive system of political and economic organiza-
tion was a necessary condition for a unified 
approach. In any case, most members of the 
team saw no need to do so: they considered 
their various approaches applicable to socialist 
as well as market or mixed systems. The af-
firmation of the legitimacy of different styles of 
development within a minimun criterion of ac-
ceptability and viability implicitly denied the 
necessity of socialist revolution without ruling 
it out as an option. In any case, the State re-
mained in the centre of attention as executor of 
whatever structural changes were feasible 
within the style of development. 
7. Neo-Marxist, participationist, 
self-reliant socialism 
This approach, for which it is particulary hard 
to find an adequate label, entered the unified 
approach debate at a late stage, introducing a 
combination of propositions deriving from 
dependency theory. Maoism and other recent 
currents in Marxism, 'conscientization' doc-
trines, etc., that had become current during the 
1960s, mainly outside the inter-governmental 
framework of debate over development. The 
approach accepted the areas of choice deriving 
from the 'minimun criterion' set forth in the 
Preliminary Report, but it brushed aside the 
legitimacy of different styles of development. 
An attempt to reformulate the unified approach 
in these terms introduced a flavour of uncom-
promising and exclusive theoretical and valor-
ative positions in place of the earnest en-
deavour to find something good in all positions 
which lingered even in the reception of the 
'far-reaching structural change' approach dis-
cussed above. It also transformed the frame-
work of internationally-aided national devel-
opment more or less accepted by the other ap-
proaches. 
According to a supporter of this approach, 
"Third World countries are faced with an alter-
native. Either they accept their dependence or 
they pursue the path of their own self-reliant 
autonomous development. In the first case, 
they are bound to increased polarization, in-
equality and mass poverty. They continue to 
accept the mobilization of their resources pri-
marily in function of foreign requirements. The 
mobilization of the immense reservoir of dor-
mant productive and creative potentialities of 
the mass of their people will remain unutilized 
or underutilized.... It is proposed that the coun-
tries of the Third World can only overcome 
their poverty and stagnation if and when they 
decide to pursue a new alternative and original 
road to development which qualitatively dif-
fers from that followed by the industrially ad-
vanced countries".9 
Since the dominant forces of the 'indus-
trially advanced' countries are responsible for 
the 'under-development' of the rest of the 
world and depend on its exploitation, the latter 
cannot look to them for 'aid' and still less take 
them as models for development. In fact, their 
style of development is morally indefensible 
and will become practically untenable once the 
Third World has taken another path; their real 
need for transformation is just as urgent and 
ineluctable as that of the Third World. 
Market incentives cannot guide the trans-
formation, nor can bureaucratic centrally-plan-
ned versions of socialism, in which objectives 
decided from above seek to speed up capital 
accumulation by depressing levels of popular 
consumption and wringing a surplus from the 
peasantry. The arousing of the creativity and 
active participation of the masses of the people 
is both a central end and a central means of a 
unified approach to development. The aim 
must be a "new man in a new society", with 
egalitarian values, frugal consumption aspira-
tions and cooperative social relationships very 
different from the present. Policies and mech-
anisms for production, distribution, and the 
provision of social services, in particular educa-
tion, must be shaped so as to contribute to this 
central aim. 
9Joost B.W. Kuitenbrouwer, Towards Self-reliant Inte-
grated Urban-rural Development (The I.C.S.W. Regional 
Conference for Asia and Western Pacific, Hong Kong, Sep-
tember 1975). This attitude to the unified approach is also 
presented in some detail in Kuitenbrouwer, Premises and 
Implications of a Unified Approach to Development Anal-
ysis and Planning (United Nations Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok, 1975), a text 
originally submitted to the project after dispersal of the 
initial team. 
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In the version that entered into the unified 
approach debates, this position —in spite of its 
radical challenge to more accommodating ap-
proaches— retained an ambiguity that was 
practically a condition for its entering at all. 
According to its premises, existing govern-
ments and the world system of States reflect 
relationships of domination and exploitation. 
For authentic development, the liberation of 
popular creativity must sweep away these rela-
tionships. Yet it suggests that 'countries' repre-
sented by their governments can 'choose' to do 
this and that the offering to them of detailed 
advice on how to do this is a legitimate activity. 
The nature of the catalytic force enabling the 
masses to change from objects of exploitation, 
cowed by repression and blinded by the lures 
of the consumer society, into creative partici-
pants in control of their own destiny remains 
obscure. 
This ambiguity, however, which persists 
in later versions of'another development', did 
not stem simply from the effort to adapt a revo-
lutionary position to the international organiza-
tions' inescapable task of "advice to govern-
ments". It corresponded to an ambiguity in the 
self-perceived role of the State in Third World 
countries that was to become increasingly evi-
dent during the 1970s. Some national political 
leaderships and some groups within national 
public administrations and even planning 
agencies did identify themselves with a Neo-
Marxist, participationist, self-reliant approach 
or parts of it. The countries in which such an 
approach exerted an appreciable influence 
within the State were generally outside the 
sphere of domination of any one central power; 
their domestic interest-groups identified with 
market-oriented economic growth were incipi-
ent or weak; and the political leadership and 
the bureaucracy thus had an apparently wide 
range of autonomy in choosing a style of devel-
opment. Under such conditions, however, their 
capacity to inspire a predominantíy rural popu-
lation to become creative participants could be 
expected to be minimal and voluntaristic mobi-
lization could easily slip into bureaucratic com-
pulsion. 
8. Ecodevelopment 
This approach centered attention on the objec-
tives of bringing production, consumption and 
human settlement patterns into harmony with 
the carrying capacity of the earth and of recon-
ciling this with an equitable distribution of re-
sources among the world's peoples, implying a 
drastic lowering of the consumption levels of 
the richer countries. It had a relatively long 
history as an organized source of criticisms of 
policies oriented exclusively to economic 
growth, parallel to but interacting very little 
with the criticisms and prescriptions made in 
the name of social development. 
The initiation of the unified approach pro-
ject coincided with the posing by the Meadows 
Report to the Club of Rome of the problem of 
'limits to growth' and with the rapid intensifica-
tion of international concern over the environ-
mental disbenefits of technological innova-
tions in production and of artificially stimu-
lated consumption. The project initially tried to 
pay its respects to these concerns without ad-
mitting them to a central position. Thus, the 
consensus set forth in the Preliminary Report 
included "protection of the human environ-
ment" among its areas of policy choice, but 
discussed it rather perfunctorily. The Prelimi-
nary Report included a qualified affirmation 
of the necessity and feasibility of production 
increases; such affirmations were becoming 
obligatory disclaimers, in texts that mentioned 
the disbenefits of economic growth, of any af-
finity with "zero growth" positions that would 
congeal the advantages of the rich countries 
and the poverty of the rest of the world: 
"It is premature to go to the other extreme 
of advocacy of zero growth rates. Levels of pro-
duction in most of the world are much too low 
to be reconcilable with any acceptable style of 
societal development, and production objec-
tives will unavoidably preoccupy many nation-
al societies for the foreseeable future. Accept-
able and viable styles of development demand 
of these societies that they should direct their 
production much more systematically to basic 
human needs, and that they should seek pro-
ductive techniques that minimize environ-
mental involvement of their human potential. 
... In the longer term, the poorer national so-
cieties should raise their per capita production 
by several fold. ... However, raising them by 
the multiple required to 'close the gap' with the 
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present high-income societies is not neces-
sarily relevant to the achievement of accept-
able styles of development..." 
In the later stages of the project, theories of 
'ecodevelopment' were considered more posi-
tively for introduction as a 'missing ingredient'. 
Such theories, identified in particular with the 
work of Ignacy Sachs at the Centre Interna-
tional de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le 
Développement in Paris, emphasized planning 
for the management of the natural and social 
resources of specific 'eco-regions', seeking 
technologies, settlement patterns, systems of 
production and distribution adapted to each 
'eco-region' and substituting as far as possible 
the use and husbanding of local renewable re-
sources for non-renewable resources. Such a 
localized approach to development, implying 
the building up of self-contained systems ca-
pable of renewing themselves and gradually 
enhancing the welfare of the local population, 
presented interesting possibilities for cross-
fertilization with several of the other ap-
proaches described above —capacitation, in-
formational enlightenment, participation i st 
development and self-reliant development— 
and also a challenge to the universalist bias of 
the project's terms of reference. Unfortunately, 
by the time ecodevelopment began to attract 
attention as a distinct alternative the opportuni-
ty for this kind of cross-fertilization had pas-
sed.10 
9. Analysis of political choices 
and development styles 
The preceding pages have indicated implicitly 
the author's preference for an approach dif-
ferent from any of the above, although not radi-
cally incompatible with most of them. Such an 
approach tries to identify and explain political 
and other factors that condition the character 
and limits of public intervention in societal 
10See Ignacy Sachs, "Population, Technology, Natural 
Resources and the Environment: Eco-development: a Con-
tribution to the Definition of Development Styles for Latin 
America", CEPAL, Economic Bulletin for Latin America, 
Vol. XVIII, Nos. 1 and 2, 1973. This approach obviously 
links with the quest for 'appropriate technologies' and simi-
lar initiatives that have flourished during the 1970s. 
change, the circumstances under which devel-
opment policies approximating to the mini-
mum criterion of acceptability and viability 
might emerge, and the identity of potential 
social agents for interventions furthering such 
'unified approaches'. It rejects the eclectic sup-
position that national societies can pick and 
choose among 'lessons' from abroad and put the 
fragments together as they please, as well as the 
supposition that there is only One Right Way to 
develop which national societies must find and 
adopt under penalty of catastrophe. Each na-
tional society faces a certain limited range of 
choices, depending on its historically condi-
tioned political, social and economic struc-
tures; its productive capacity; its natural and 
human resources; its dominant values; and its 
place in the international order. These factors 
imply differing advantages, degrees of equity 
or inequity, costs and dangers. Certain choices 
are either permanently outside the society's 
reach or feasible only through a revolutionary 
transformation that cannot be willed deliber-
ately by a regime shaped by existing values and 
power relationships. In the terms adopted by 
the Preliminary Report, different real and 
preferred styles of development can be asses-
sed against a double criterion of viability and 
acceptability. Such an approach cannot evade 
search for a theoretical framework or set of hy-
potheses to order its analyses of national so-
cieties, but does not expect this quest ever to be 
more than partially and provisionally success-
ful. In the version here described, the approach 
recognizes a permanent danger of becoming 
ridden by theory, selecting or interpreting facts 
to fit the theory, and universalizing phenomena 
that may be conjunctural or local. It finds con-
spicuous examples of this danger in many at-
tempts to use Marxism as a framework for anal-
ysis and action. 
The organizers of the 'unified approach' 
project incorporated political and social struc-
tural analysis from the beginning as a correc-
tive to the normative, technical and institu-
tional approaches whose integration they en-
visaged. The proponents of the latter ap-
proaches could not help being aware of the 
political and social stumbling blocks, which 
most of them had encountered directly, as de-
velopment planners and consultants. How-
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ever, they naturally wanted not a panoramic 
view of all the stumbling blocks in the way of 
their vision of the Good Society but ideas on 
how to remove them so that their preferred 
strategies could advance. 
The approach was open to the criticism 
that it led to the demoralizing conclusion that 
'nothing could be done'. While the version that 
entered into the project affirmed that many 
things could and should be done by many kinds 
of social agents, it remained frankly skeptical 
about the unified approach conceived as a set of 
universally applicable prescriptions —wheth-
er prescriptions for the allocation of resources, 
for techniques of diagnosis and planning, or 
for transformation of societal structures and 
values. Human institutions, from the interna-
tional order to the local group, were engaged in 
games so complex and for such varied prizes 
that attempts to make sense of them and influ-
ence them in the name of development called 
for an exceptional combination of audacity and 
humility. The unified approach project might 
contribute something along these lines if it 
remained iconoclastic, aware of the ritualistic 
side of the activity in which it was engaged and 
the ambivalences in all human endeavours. It 
could not take for granted either that national 
societies were potentially perfectable, once 
their shortcomings were diagnosed correctly, 
nor that their irrationalities and inequities 
called for root-and-branch destruction and 
transformation. 
Several alternative criteria for classifying 
'approaches' bring out other tensions and am-
biguities in the quest for unified development 
prescriptions. In terms of polar positions one 
can distinguish: 
Technocratic vs. participationist ap-
proaches. The former supposes that properly 
qualified specialists can find the one correct or 
optimal solution to each problem, adding up to 
the optimal style of development. Develop-
ment policy can be unified to the extent to 
which such specialists can seek and apply the 
solutions without compromises to meet incom-
patible demands and resistances. Ideally, then, 
'participation' should mean indoctrination in 
the nature of the optimal solution and corre-
sponding behaviour. The latter approach sup-
poses either that the optimal solution can 
emerge only from the creativity of the people, 
in control of its own destiny, or that there is no 
one optimal solution but that various satisfacto-
ry solutions can emerge from democratic polit-
ical competition. Technocratic imposition, or 
reliance on policies that do not require popular 
understanding, is inherently sterile. 
Centrality of economic or sociological 
laws vs. human-welfare-oriented voluntarism. 
The laws looked to by the former approach 
might be those of the market, or of the psycho-
logical conditions for planned modification of 
human behaviour, or of the socio-economic 
conditions for transition to socialism. The sup-
position is that unified development depends 
on correct understanding of the laws and some 
combination of submission to and manipula-
tion of the preconditions they impose. The lat-
ter position denies either the bindingness of the 
laws or the possibility of their infallible inter-
pretation. Social agents should therefore guide 
their efforts primarily by their values. The ex-
tent to which these values can be realized and 
human welfare enhanced will be revealed only 
in the course of struggle and innovation. While 
the former of these positions seems to have 
more affinity with the technocratic approach 
and the latter with the participationist, either 
can co-exist with a predominantly technocratic 
or participationist outlook. 
Reliance on theoretical or methodological 
frames of reference vs. pragmatic acceptance 
of whatever works. This contrast resembles the 
preceding, but with both polar positions more 
modest. The frame of reference does not pre-
tend to explain the laws of development or soci-
etal change, but those of planning under speci-
fied conditions and with specified tools. The 
pragmatism applies itself to the amplification 
and adaptation of social and economic tech-
niques that seem to have proved their useful-
ness, without aspiring to a voluntarist 'big 
push' towards the Good Society. 
Universalist vs. particularist approaches. 
The former position supposes that develop-
ment must mean approximately the same thing 
for all national societies, whatever that mean-
ing may be: all societies must become predomi-
nantly industrialized, urban and market-ori-
ented; or all societies must become democrat-
ically egalitarian; or all societies must become 
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collectivist and frugal in their life styles and 
use of resources. Universalism often combines 
with catastrophist all-or-nothing positions: un-
less mankind as a whole rapidly achieves cer-
tain objectives of productive capacity, technol-
ogical restraint, social justice, disarmament, 
freedom, consumption austerity, or population 
limitation, mankind as a whole, or the 'world', 
or 'civilization' is doomed. The universalist ap-
proaches also sometimes carry the connota-
tion that 'development ' should mean a transi-
tion from a static 'bad' situation to a static 'good' 
situation; once mankind as a whole has over-
come poverty, injustice, violence and waste it 
had better remain in harmony or balance with 
its environment. 
The variants of the particularist position 
suppose that national societies, or whatever 
forms of social organization replace them, will 
cont inue to develop along many different lines, 
some more 'acceptable' for their values and 
some more 'viable' for their internal coherence 
T h e unified approach project, as already noted, 
was one manifestation —and a relatively mod-
est one— of the divergence in interpretations of 
development and the multiplication of attri-
butes of development that had gained momen-
tum during the 1960s and that was to become 
more pronounced and complex at the begin-
ning of the 1970s. 'Development ' must stand 
for something worth striving for, and the idea of 
increasing productive capacity —particularly 
industrial capacity— through capital accumula-
tion, investment and technological innovation 
was still at the core of this something at the 
beginning of the 1970s. Experience was mak-
ing it harder to believe, however, that growth in 
production by itself, whether guided by the 
market or by central planning, would bring 
about equitably distributed gains in human 
welfare, or that sufficient growth to permit ac-
and efficiency than others. None of them is 
likely to reach a harmonious and static perfec-
tion, and some of them can be expected to de-
generate or even perish, because of their mis-
takes or because of an insuperable combination 
of disadvantages. There may or may not be an 
objectively definable optimal style of develop-
ment for each society but, except in terms too 
general to be useful, there can be no univer-
sally optimal style. This inevitable diversity 
has its dangers, particularly of conflicts be-
tween national societies and exploitation of the 
weak by the strong, but also its advantages: the 
homogenization of mankind is neither possible 
nor desirable; the wider the range of styles of 
development, the greater the likelihood that a 
positive cross-fertilization will take place in the 
future. T h e particularist as well as the univer-
salist position can, of course, combine with a 
technocratic or a participation i st bias, with a 
belief in iron laws of development or in volun-
tarism. 
complishment of this end was within the reach 
of the poorer countries without major changes 
in their internal policies and their place in the 
world system. Advocates of a very wide range 
of objectives and policies were arguing not 
only that their concerns constituted essential 
attributes of" authentic development, but also 
that in order to achieve the other objectives of 
development, priority must be given to these 
concerns. The unified approach project was in-
structed in its terms of reference to find out how 
to unify what was unifiable in these different 
positions from the standpoint of one of them: 
the composite of human welfare objectives and 
social sectoral programmes that had come to be 
labelled 'social development ' . Before it could 
accomplish this, however, the range of posi-
tions to be unified had widened considerably. 
For the present, it will be enough to sum-
IV 
The changing international market for propositions on 
development during and since the unified approach project 
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marize certain features of the changing inter-
national market for propositions on develop-
ment inside and outside the intergovernmental 
organizations. 
Within the latter the main framework for 
debate was the Second United Nations Devel-
opment Decade, to be governed by an Interna-
tional Development Strategy approved by the 
United Nations General Assembly in October 
1970. The Strategy provided for procedures of 
periodic 'review and appraisal' of progress by 
the various United Nations organs, and these 
generated a formidable volume of reports. As 
long as the Strategy seemed to have some po-
tential relevance to government policies the 
proponents of different approaches and priori-
ties presented their proposals as amplifications 
of points in the Strategy, or changes of empha-
sis, or means of implementing the Strategy. 
One justification for the initiation of the 'uni-
fied approach' project had indeed been the en-
richment of the Strategy's social content. 
The Strategy juxtaposed two main kinds of 
propositions, some clinging to the expectations 
of the first Development Decade, others re-
sponding to the criticisms of its excessive focus 
on economic growth. During the Decade new 
proposals superseded both kinds: 
(i) Propositions on international econom-
ic relations and on the duty of the richer coun-
tries to aid the development of the rest of the 
world through allocation of a minimum per-
centage of their national income and through 
fairer trade policies. The Strategy presented 
propositions of this kind in considerable detail 
but in compromise formulations that emerged 
from bargaining between representatives of 
governments that wanted binding commit-
ments and representatives of governments that 
wanted to ward off such commitments without 
a flat rejection. As the decade progressed the 
struggle for and against commitments was 
repeated in forum after forum. By 1974, the 
compromises reached in the Strategy were ob-
viously inoperative and the Third World gov-
ernments turned their attention to a Declara-
tion and Programme of Action on the Establish-
ment of a New International Economic Order 
(NIEO), for which most of the First World gov-
ernments, now constituting a small minority in 
the United Nations, assumed no concrete re-
sponsibility. The debates over international 
economic relations fall outside the scope of the 
present chapter, but it is worth emphasizing 
that for the representatives of the majority of 
Third World governments the question of in-
ternational economic relations remained cen-
tral and the hope of obtaining firm commit-
ments remained alive; many of these represen-
tatives looked on the questions to be discussed 
below either as harmless expressions of good 
intentions or as dangerous distractions from 
their central demands. They also continued to 
assume that development could mean for their 
countries what it had meant for the countries 
now industrialized, and that international in-
terdependence through trade and financial 
flows could persist indefinitely, reformed but 
not transformed. 
(ii) Propositions on the content of devel-
opment at the national level. The Strategy's 
appeal for a unified approach has already been 
cited, along with its treatment of sectoral social 
objectives. During the 1970s the sessions of 
some regional United Nations organs approved 
more elaborate and somewhat bolder formulas 
on integrated development and the social 
meaning of development through their ap-
praisals of progress under the strategy, but 
otherwise the social propositions attracted lit-
tle attention. By the mid-1970s a series of de-
tailed proposals for development approaches 
focussing on 'redistribution with growth', elim-
ination of extreme poverty and priority to satis-
faction of basic needs, emanating mainly from 
the World Bank and the International Labour 
Organisation were disputing the world stage 
with the New International Economic Order, 
replacing the innocuous juxtaposition of eco-
nomic and social objectives by a new version of 
the old controversy over priorities. The 'basic 
needs' and related approaches treated policies 
for production, technological innovation, dis-
tribution and employment as central but sub-
ordinated their content to immediate human 
welfare ends. A good many proponents of the 
NIEO interpreted this as a tactic of the central 
capitalist countries, intended to justify failure 
to attend to trade and aid demands and restric-
tion of the Third World to a form of second-rate 
semi-development through labour-intensive 
technologies. In fact, the new approaches had 
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several variants, some of them envisaging mo-
dest reallocations of resources to the poor and 
gains through aided self-help, others calling for 
the transformation of structures of production 
and distribution and an end to the affluence of 
minorities. Non-governmental institutions 
were able to carry these ideas farther toward 
the construction of coherent alternatives for the 
human future, the most ambitious of these at-
tempts being the proposal of the Dag Hammar-
skjõld Foundation for 'another development', 
published in 1975. 
An equally striking feature of the interna-
tional treatment of development during the 
1970s however, was the successive bringing 
into the foreground of a series of 'major prob-
lems' treated with what became a stereotyped 
ritual. 
Population, the human environment, the 
status of women, habitat, employment and 
hunger were taken up in this way. In each case 
the problem was real enough and had long 
been the overriding concern of some institu-
tions and sectors of opinion, mainly in the First 
World countries. The persistence of the con-
cerned parties and usually some evident inten-
sification of the problem brought it into the 
forefront of attention. 
When this happened, the United Nations 
General Assembly might then proclaim an In-
ternational Year to recognize the importance of 
the problem. A World Conference would be 
convened, preceded by regional conferences 
and meetings of'experts' on the relation of the 
problem to other problems, the World Confer-
ence would approve a Plan of Action, and more 
regional conferences and specialized meetings 
would be convened to discuss application of 
this Plan. A temporary or permanent interna-
tional secretariat would come into being and a 
fund to finance practical measures to deal with 
the problem would be set up. 
Recognition of the problem would go 
through several phases. Simple cause-and-ef-
fect interpretations of the problem and direct 
remedies would be intensively publicized and 
then subjected to criticism from many direc-
tions. Representatives of the Third World 
would indicate their suspicions of the origins of 
initial interpretations of the problem and their 
disposition to recognize the need for action 
only to the extent that this would not divert 
attention from economic development and 
from the duty of the rich countries to help such 
development. In any case, it could be demon-
strated that the problem was complexly related 
to all other major problems; it could be solved 
only in the context of development. Thus, all 
roads led back to the unified approach. 
But who was to do the unifying? Conceiv-
ably, any of the major problems might provide 
the starting point toward a comprehensive con-
ception and strategy of development, around 
which the other problems and desiderata might 
be grouped, but they could not all occupy the 
centre at once. The gap between the capacity of 
governments and other human institutions in 
the real world to diagnose, choose and set prior-
ities, and the demands that they advance to-
ward multiple objectives in a unified way was 
wide enough already, and each 'major problem' 
threatened to widen it further. At the same 
time, it could be argued that, overwhelmed as 
they were, governments would not act on the 
major problems unless these were brought to 
their attention insistently, backed by organized 
popular pressures and warnings as to the indis-
pensability of quick solutions to ward off catas-
trophe. 
Meanwhile, outside the international bu-
reaucratic and academic circles where it was 
more or less obligatory to profess faith in the 
benevolence and rationality of governments, 
several kinds of challenge to the whole struc-
ture of international development strategies, 
new international economic orders and plans of 
action became more insistent. Each of these 
challenges included variants ranging from 
wholesale negation to qualified criticisms of 
the conventional wisdom: 
(i) 'Economic development' was reduced 
to the status of a mobilizing myth even by some 
economists prominent in development policy-
making, most eloquently by Celso Furtado: 
"Myths function as lamps that illuminate the 
field of perception of the social scientist, allow-
ing him to have a clear vision of certain prob-
lems and to see nothing of others at the same 
time as they give him spiritual tranquillity 
since the value judgements that he makes ap-
pear to his spirit as a reflection of objective 
reality. 
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"Today we know irrefutably that the econ-
omies of the periphery will never be developed 
in the sense of becoming similar to the econ-
omies that form the present centre of the capi-
talist system. But how can one deny that this 
idea has been very useful, to mobilize the peo-
ples of the periphery and induce them to accept 
enormous sacrifices, to legitimate the destruc-
tion of archaic forms of culture, to explain and 
make them understand the necessity of de-
stroying their physical environment, to justify 
forms of dependency that reinforce the pred-
atory character of the productive system? 
"I t can thus be affirmed that the idea of 
economic development is simply a myth. 
Thanks to this it has been possible to divert 
attention from the basic tasks of identifying the 
fundamental needs of the collectivity and the 
possibilities that the progress of science opens 
to humanity, so as to concentrate attention on 
abstract objectives such as investment, exports 
and growth".11 
Such a challenge knocked one leg out from 
u n d e r the declarations of meeting after meet-
ing that wedded the 'abstract objectives' of 
economic development to basic needs or 'major 
problems ' . 
(ii) Faith in the market as arbiter of devel-
opmental choices, in the inexhaustibility of 
natural resources, and in the ability of human 
ingenuity, spurred by market incentives, to 
solve problems as they arose, persisted and 
became more aggressive during the 1970s as 
the shortcomings of governmental and inter-
governmental interventionism became more 
glaring. According to the proponents of variants 
of this position, from Daniel Moynihan to 
Herman Kahn and Milton Friedman, the main 
danger for the human future lay in the zeal to 
b ind it by regulations, and the main stumbling 
block in the way of the development of poor 
countries lay in their hankering after welfare 
state policies and socialist planning. The domi-
nant forces in a good many Third World coun-
tries had clung to such views even during the 
years of rising prestige for planning and 'social 
development ' measures. During the 1970s the 
'^Celso Furtado, El desarrollo económico: Un mito 
(Siglo XXI Editores, Mexico City, 1975). 
influence of neo-liberalism on government pol-
icies became more open and even doctrinaire, 
particularly in certain 'semi-developed' coun-
tries of Latin America and Southeast Asia. 
While the governments of these countries par-
ticipated in Third World solidarity as regards 
demands for changes in international economic 
relations, that is, for better access to markets 
and credits, they remained aloof from the ac-
companying formulas on socially-oriented or 
unified development, and actively opposed 
some of the more specific commitments for 
action on 'major problems'. 
(iii) The penetration of transnational en-
terprises in the economies of the Third World, 
the emergence of 'transnational elites' identi-
fied with these enterprises, and the mutation 
of national cultures and consumption patterns 
brought about by trans nationally-manipulated 
mass communication media and advertising 
made the vision of autonomous and self-sus-
taining national development seem obsoles-
cent. The relevant development strategies for 
the future might be those of the transnational s 
rather than those of the governments. 
(iv) Two kinds of challenges emerged 
from alarm over the prospects for resource ex-
haustion, environmental contamination, the 
potential destructiveness of new technologies, 
and over-population. The more direct chal-
lenge denied the possibility or desirability of 
anything identifiable with previous concep-
tions of development. Some variants of this 
position derived from it conclusions on the 
duty of the rich national societies to limit their 
consumption and assist the poorer countries in 
an equitable transition to 'zero population 
growth' and 'zero economic growth', thus ap-
proximating to one of the approaches to a uni-
fied approach described above. Other variants 
concluded that the rich societies should set 
their own houses in order and help other soci-
eties only if the latter showed promise of vi-
ability. Still others concluded that the momen-
tum of current trends and the limited capacity 
for foresight and rational action made the 
avoidance of catastrophe unlikely either for 
humanity as a whole or for the better-off soci-
et ies. Small groups and families might be able 
to shield themselves by preparing in advance 
for austere and self-reliant life styles and by 
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withdrawing from the urban-industrial centres 
whe re catastrophe would be most sweeping. In 
the international discussions of development 
and of such 'major problems' as population, 
environment, and food supply the variants of 
this challenge figured prominently as heresies 
to be renounced. 
Variants on the other challenge emerging 
from this diagnosis admitted the possibility of 
solutions to the resource, environmental and 
population problems, but insisted that these 
solutions would have to be comprehensive and 
'counter-intuitive' . Piecemeal 'practical' re-
sponses to problems as they arose would only 
make matters worse through their impact on 
other systematically related areas. One variant 
then quest ioned the capacity of human institu-
tions to devise and manage such comprehen-
sive solutions: social and political limits would 
cripple development before the environmental 
and resource limits were reached. Another 
variant reasoned that solutions guaranteeing 
human survival would require a high degree of 
regimentation and suppression of dissent, and 
under these conditions the values of human 
welfare, equity and creativity, along with free-
dom, would go by the board. 
(v) Diagnoses of the inherently exploita-
tive character of the international capitalist 
order and of the structures of class and power in 
national States led to many variants of the con-
clusion that both must be destroyed as a pre-
condition for the Good Society. These posi-
t ions, through their links with the dominant 
forces in certain Third World countries, with 
organized terrorist movements and with inter-
national political struggles on the one hand, 
and with participationist and 'another develop-
ment ' visions on the other, had complex and 
ambiguous relationships to the international 
discussions of prescriptions for development, 
bu t logically negated their relevance. The 
dominant forces in the central capitalist coun-
tries could not be committed to end their ex-
ploitation of the rest of the world, even if 
the governments they controlled entered into 
agreements to do so. The most that could be 
expected was an unacceptable 'renegotiation of 
the terms of dependence ' , benefitting only the 
exploiting minorities in the dependent coun-
tries. 
The only solution for the latter, once their 
own people gained control of them, would be to 
cut all economic and political ties and accept 
the consequences in terms of austerity and of 
the liquidation of the minorities identified, 
through their economic roles and their con-
sumption patterns, with the1 previous ties of 
dependency. Relations could then be re-
opened selectively, mainly with national soci-
eties having similar genuinely revolutionary 
regimes. 
The same revolutionary positions denied 
that existing national governments, whatever 
the intentions of individuals within them, had 
any ability to achieve an acceptable social and 
economic -order. Even those labelling them-
selves 'socialist' were really 'bureaucratic capi-
talist'. The weakness of their political leaders 
and bureaucracies in the face of the interna-
tional order and the transnational enterprises, 
their inability to identify themselves with the 
people , and their consumerist aspirations ruled 
them out. A profound and creatively destruc-
tive uprising of the masses was called for, and 
the will of these masses rather than interna-
tional prescriptions would govern the longer-
term future. 
V 
The place of the unified approach project in the 
international rethinking of development 
T h e term 'unified approach to development' 
has retained a certain currency in international 
circles during the 1970s, and a good many of the 
ideas put forward under this label in meetings 
or by development advisers can be traced to the 
project here discussed. Variants of these ideas 
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would have circulated in any case, but the main 
feature that distinguished the partial consensus 
reached in the project has barely received a 
hearing. 
T h e Preliminary Report, as already noted, 
did not pretend to offer either an original theo-
ry of development or a comprehensive set of 
practical prescriptions. Despite some internal 
inconsistencies, it tried to propose a flexible 
way of thinking about development and of con-
fronting its minimum criterion of acceptability 
and viability with national situations and an 
international order in which nothing could be 
taken for granted, in which planning and for-
mulation of norms tended to become ritual ac-
tivities compensating for inability to influence 
real trends within the constraints under which 
social agents, inside and outside national gov-
ernments , acted. A study under intergovern-
mental auspices could not honestly do much 
more than say: if your society has such-and-
such characteristics and the institutions or 
groups you represent want to achieve such-
and-such objectives, you should take into ac-
count certain factors, and you may find certain 
methods more helpful than others. These bare 
bones of a proposition, of course, might be giv-
en life through intensive studies .of national 
experiences, but the limited material ability of 
the project to do this had been exhausted at an 
early stage. 
T h e Commission for Social Development 
and the Economic and Social Council, to which 
the Preliminary Report was presented, natural-
ly wanted more than this, and requested that a 
final report "be prepared in such a way as to be 
of the greatest possible practical use to plan-
ners , decision-makers, and administrators". 
Since the project team had already dispersed 
and its budget was exhausted, preparation of a 
final report on the scale orginally envisaged 
was no longer practicable. UNRISD responded 
to the request with a brief "final report" sub-
mitted to the 1975 session of the Commission 
for Social Development. This report spelled 
out in more detail some of the proposals on 
development analysis and planning contained 
in the Preliminary Report and introduced the 
idea of 'capacitation', but also reiterated that: 
" I t is a conclusion of the study that action for 
unified development should depend on diag-
nosis of particular circumstances. Practicality, 
therefore, must lie largely in general principles 
of approach and suggestions of ways of going 
about reaching concrete solutions, rather than 
in a universal action model of unified develop-
ment presumed suitable for all types of devel-
oping countries. Even so, suggestions in a 
report of this kind on such a vast subject must 
be put forward with considerable modesty".12 
The United Nations policy-making bodies 
d id not allow this answer to be final. They next 
requested the Secretary-General to "prepare a 
report on the application by Governments of a 
unified approach to development analysis and 
planning", and also to prepare proposals for 
'pilot projects' demonstrating the practical ap-
plication of a unified approach. 
These requests, in fact, juxtaposed two 
very different visions of the unified approach 
that were advanced by representatives of dif-
ferent governments. The first derived from the 
thesis that "far-reaching structural changes" 
within national societies were the essential 
precondition for a unified approach. Certain 
governments felt they possessed the correct 
specifications for such changes; while they 
could not expect to obtain inter-governmental 
consensus on them, they could use the unified 
approach to keep them in the forefront of atten-
tion and demonstrate their own achievements. 
The second derived from the conception of 
the unified approach as mainly a question of 
integrating social and economic programmes, 
and also from a supposition going back to the 
beginning of United Nations social activities 
that the concentration of advanced methods 
and integrated services on a local population 
would provide lessons and achievements that 
could then be duplicated on a wider scale. 
Although this expectation had rarely if ever 
been fulfilled, the perpetuation of small-scale 
social technical assistance projects, the obvious 
virtues of integration of services, and the politi-
cal, informational and bureaucratic difficulties 
in the way of such integration at the national 
level had continually revived it. The unified 
approach project had harboured hopes of this 
i2Report on a Unified Approach to Development Anal-
ysis and Planning (E/CN.5/519,5 December 1974). 
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kind, particularly in relation to the importance 
of localized information, but its main emphasis 
had been on the national level. A unified ap-
proach focussing on pilot projects might be ex-
pected to appeal to governments that had no 
intention of sponsoring far-reaching structural 
changes and preferred to direct attention to the 
potential of modest but better-administered in-
cremental changes. 
By this time, while UNRISD continued to 
struggle to bring the research aspects of the 
unified approach to a coherent conclusion, the 
responsibility for acting on the new request 
had fallen mainly to the Secretariat Centre for 
Development Planning, Projections and Poli-
cies, an economically-oriented body that had in 
the past been decidedly cool towards the uni-
fied approach. Since the Secretariat was not in a 
position to decide which governments, if any, 
were applying a unified approach, however 
defined, or to evaluate their efforts, it fell back 
on its traditional method of dealing with con-
troversial mandates. It circulated a request for 
information to governments, as it had also done 
recently in response to another resolution re-
questing information on the introduction of far-
reaching social and economic changes. It 
sorted out the twenty countries that responded 
into "countries with centrally planned econo-
mies", "countries with developed market 
economies" and "countries with developing 
market economies" and summarized the infor-
mation they provided (mainly on their plan-
ning systems), concluding that "while many 
countries have introduced an integrated or uni-
fied approach to development planning, clear-
ly there is no unique approach that can be con-
sidered applicable to all countries".13 Some 
members of the bodies to which the report was 
presented expressed disappointment at the in-
conclusiveness of this conclusion, but in view 
of the small number of governments that had 
troubled to reply to the request, it was evident 
that this method of pursuing the unified ap-
proach could not yield much more. 
The Secretariat also prepared proposals for 
pilot projects, but in spite of their cautious for-
13Application by Governments of a Unified Approach 
to Development Analysis and Planning, Report of the Sec-
retary-General (E/CN.540,22 September 1976). 
mulation these encountered resistance in the 
Economic and Social Council: "Several repre-
sentatives expressed the view that the projects 
on the unified approach must take fully into 
consideration the imperatives of the sover-
eignty of Member States. They emphasized 
that full account must first be taken of the de-
velopment goals set by each country for itself. 
Since each country had its own conception of 
the appropriate economic, social and political 
systems, development plans and policy mea-
sures adopted by Governments could be for-
mulated and implemented only in the context 
of the actual conditions prevailing in individu-
al countries. A project on integrated develop-
ment planning should therefore neither seek a 
universal applicability of its findings nor be 
used to monitor and pass judgement, based on a 
single set of criteria, on the development objec-
tives and performance of developing coun-
tries".14 
The Economic and Social Council re-
quested reformulation of the proposals, but by 
this time the unified approach as a distinct line 
of inquiry had reached an impasse. Moreover, 
its consideration in the United Nations policy-
making bodies was being submerged in that of 
several other kinds of normative approach: 
first, the reformulations of international devel-
opment policy, in particular the Programme of 
Action on the Establishment of a New Interna-
tional Economic Order, the Charter of Eco-
nomic Rights and Duties of States, and General 
Assembly resolution 3362 (S-VII) of 16 Sep-
tember 1975 on "Development and Interna-
tional Economic Co-operation"; second, the 
various crusades for attention to 'major prob-
lems', and third, the proposals emanating from 
the International Labour Organisation and the 
World Bank for development policies focussed 
on satisfaction of basic needs or elimination of 
extreme poverty. These last approaches were 
sometimes identified with the unified ap-
proach, and had, in fact, inherited some of 
the project's central propositions on policy 
choices. 
The reformulated pilot project proposals of 
^Projects on the Practical Application of a Unified 
Approach to Development Analysis and Planning, Report 
of the Secretary-General (E/5974,4 May 1977). 
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the Secretariat were limited to studies of 
changing priorities revealed by the national 
plans of developing countries, studies of na-
tional experiences in the implementation of 
plans, and training for officials of developing 
countries on the "main aspects of integrated 
development planning". The skeptical and 
radically revisionist attitude toward plans and 
planning that had been prominent in the uni-
fied approach project seemed to have faded 
away.15 
The unified approach project exerted some 
influence in the regional commissions of the 
United Nations and was influenced by currents 
of thinking already present in them, but the 
elements interchanged differed, partly be-
cause of the nature of the contacts between the 
project and these bodies, and partly because of 
the differing national situations and policy pre-
occupations faced by the commissions. The 
project's studies of national experiences had 
already suggested the latter differences. 
In Latin America, a region that was begin-
ning to be labelled 'semi-developed', ques-
tions of viable choices between styles of de-
velopment and the relation of such choices to 
ideologies and to the distribution of political 
power were in the forefront of attention. Did 
the capitalist 'development' or modernization 
of peripheral countries such as those of Latin 
America unavoidably generate increasing de-
pendence on the world centres, increasing in-
equalities in the distribution of consumption 
and wealth, increasing insecurity and relative 
if not absolute poverty for large parts of the 
population, and increasing repression of pro-
tests? How could the evident gains in produc-
tive capacity, economic and social infrastruc-
ture, qualifications of the labour force and gov-
ernmental administrative resources be con-
verted into gains in human welfare, and who 
would be the societal agents of such a conver-
sion? The experience of different countries of 
the region suggested that policies concentrat-
l s T h e 5-page report cited in the preceding footnote 
seems to be the most recent manifestation of the unified 
approach as a separate topic in United Nations delibera-
tions, other than a supplement to the document on "Ap-
plication by Governments", containing summaries of tive 
additional replies received up to 31 October 1978. 
ing on rapid economic growth through govern-
mental stimulation of market forces, or on struc-
tural transformation and social equality, could 
be successful on their own terms, at differing 
high costs, and if backed by sufficient power, 
but that the prospects for policies trying to 
reconcile multiple objectives of growth and 
welfare under conditions of open political com-
petition were rather poor. Styles of develop-
ment meeting the minimun criterion of the 
unified approach seemed to call for a transfor-
mation of values and expectations as well as 
power structures, but the circumstances of 
semi-development, in particular the penetra-
tion of transnational enterprises and the con-
sumption aspirations of the 'modern' sectors of 
the population, made the way to such a trans-
formation hard to envisage. 
The Economic Commission for Latin 
America (CEPAL) had raised problems of this 
kind in several studies16 and had contributed to 
the project the approach labelled above "anal-
ysis of political choices". The ideas generated 
in the project in turn influenced further studies 
and polemics in the CEPAL Secretariat on 
styles of development.17 
Moreover, the ideas entered into a series of 
normative declarations approved by the 
CEPAL member governments at the Commis-
sion's 1973,1975 and 1977 sessions, within the 
context of their periodic appraisals of progress 
under the Second Development Decade.18 The 
propositions on 'integrated development' in 
these declarations, while actively supported by 
a minority of governments, show a surprising 
degree of acquiescence by the majority in what 
amounted to a condemnation of what was vis-
ibly happening in the name of development 
16
 See, in particular, Raúl Prebisch, Towards a Dynam-
ic Development Policy for Latin America (United Nations, 
New York, 1963); Transformation and Development: The 
Great Task of Latin America (report presented to the Inter-
American Development Bank by Raúl Prebisch, 1970), and 
Social Change and Social Development Policy in Latin 
America (United Nations, New York, 1970). 
17
 See, in particular, the papers by Raúl Prebisch, Aní-
bal Pinto, Jorge Graciarena and Marshall Wolfe in CEPAL 
Review, No. 1, first half of 1976. 
1 8Regional Appraisals of the Internacional Develop-
ment Strategy: Quito, 1973 and Chaguaramas, 1975 (in 
"Cuadernos de la CEPAL", No.2),and Guatemala, 1977 (in 
"Cuadernos de la CEPAL", No. 17). 
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and an affirmation that "the objective of de-
velopment in Latin America must be the cre-
ation of a new society and a new type of man". 
The 1975 appraisal placed this aspiration in a 
more sober perspective: "In spite of the pro-
fessed aims and of the greater material capacity 
to eliminate poverty which ought to be implicit 
in the favourable economic growth rates of sev-
eral countries, it is... not surprising that the rate 
of progress toward the attainment of social de-
velopment goals is extremely slow. It is now 
more important than ever that the governments 
of Latin America should not —either through 
excessive optimism regarding the spontaneous 
results of accelerated economic growth or 
through pessimism regarding the possibility of 
looking into the future and influencing the pro-
cesses of social change in such a complex and 
changing situation— lose sight of the fact that, 
in order to achieve equitable and integrated 
development, greater efforts are needed to-
gether with a thorough, realistic knowledge 
and appreciation of what is happening". 
Finally, an exhaustive study of develop-
ment theories and their application in Latin 
America carried out by the Latin American In-
stitute for Economic and Social Planning 
(ILPES) associated with CEPAL dismissed the 
unified approach and the intergovernmental 
normative declarations associated with it in the 
following terms : 
"The unified approach is not only the clear 
expression of a technocratic utopia but also, in 
spite of its name, it is a utopia made by ag-
gregation of objectives, whose validity by 
themselves hardly anyone can deny, accom-
panied by continual reserves to the effect that 
the particular situation can legitimate their not 
being achieved and even their being set aside 
for an indeterminate and interminable future. 
A unified approach to development worthy of 
the name supposes a unified social science, 
which does not exist at present and which 
could only be constructed on certain philo-
sophical postulates, derived from a general 
theory, which in turn could not count on gen-
eral support for a long time to come. At the same 
time, an international declaration of objectives 
can be possible only through evading philo-
sophical-political differences, so that the only 
possible base of a unified approach, a common 
philosophy, is ruled out from the beginning. 
When such a declaration purports to be a uni-
fied approach, the only way to do it that is 
apparently legitimate is through the aggrega-
tion of objectives".19 
In the Economic and Social Commission 
for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) the reception 
of the unified approach was at first conditioned 
by the relatively complex social services and 
planning-administrative machinery of the 
larger countries and by periodic meetings of an 
ESCAP committee on social development. The 
unified approach was seen mainly as a new 
attempt to tackle the previous concerns of the 
committee: better integration of government 
social and economic programmes, higher prior-
ity to the 'social', and more adequate statistical 
indicators for the social objectives of develop-
ment. However, the increasingly ominous in-
capacity of urban-industrially biased economic 
growth and social programmes to cope with 
mass poverty in mainly rural populations, to-
gether with the presence of China as a dem-
onstration of the possibility of a radically dif-
ferent style, brought about an openness, in 
ESCAP papers and in advisory missions, to the 
participation!st self-reliant approach described 
above, in a variant deriving directly from the 
later stages of the unified approach project.20 
In Africa, the unified approach entered 
into discussion mainly through a joint Econom-
ic Commission for Africa (ECA)/UNRISD 
study presented to the Sixth Session of the 
Conference of African Planners in October 
1976,21 and through visits of ECA/UNRISD 
teams to seven African countries. The study 
analysed all available African development 
plans currently in force in order to determine 
the degree to which the plan documents rep-
resent a systematic attempt to deal with the 
problem of uneven development, insofar as this 
19
 Aldo E. Solari, Rolando Franco, Joel Jutkowitz, Teo-
ría, acción social y desarrollo en América Latina, Textos 
del ILPES, Mexico City, Siglo XXI Editores S.A., 1976, p. 
621. 
2 0 See Joost B.W. Kuitenbrouwer, op. cit, and also re-
ports of advisory missions to the Philippines, Pakistan and 
Papua-New Guinea. 
2 1
 Application of a Unified Approach to Development 
Analysis and Planning under African Conditions (E/CN. 
14/CAP.6/4). 
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could be ascertained from the range and spec-
ification of plan objectives, from the type of 
planning information and procedures used, 
and from planned policies and projects relating 
to the provision of essential services, the com-
position of production, research and technolo-
gy, institutional change, and external economic 
relations. The visits to countries similarly con-
centrated on planning objectives and tech-
niques. The study and visits found, not unex-
pectedly, a certain correspondence between 
the objectives stated in the preambles to plans 
and the human-welfare-oriented terms of refer-
ence of the unified approach project, but also, 
very nebulous relationships between these ob-
jectives and the projects and techniques con-
tained in the body of the plans. Several reasons 
were given to explain these divergences —lack 
of manpower and finance, inadequate political 
commitment, unavailability of relevant data, 
deliberate distortions by executing agencies. 
Another argument sometimes given was that 
projects on behalf of the 'little man' are ex-
tremely difficult to organize and manage, while 
big projects involving intensive capital invest-
ment can be set up and run much more ef-
fectively. 
The African study thus started by accept-
ing provisionally the plans as valid expressions 
of national policy and the planners —the main 
interlocutors of the study team— as key social 
agents. By pointing to gaps and shortcomings 
the study then tried to suggest modest and 
incremental improvements rather than radical-
ly different styles and strategies. How could 
planners make better diagnoses and influence 
policy more effectively towards human welfare 
objectives under conditions of rudimentary in-
formation, political instability, and very lim-
ited resources susceptible to allocation by the 
State? At the same time, the United Nations 
African Institute for Economic Development 
and Planning (IDEP) was diagnosing the exist-
ing styles of development of the African coun-
tries as neither acceptable nor viable and prop-
osing variants of the self-reliant participationist 
approach; however, the contacts between this 
line of thinking within Africa and the unfied 
approach project were slight. 
The terms of reference of the unified ap-
proach project had focussed on the needs of the 
'developing' or 'poor' countries. Its potential 
relevance to the countries that defined them-
selves as 'developed' was never clearly spec-
ified. According to some of the approaches that 
entered into the project, these countries fig-
ured mainly as sources of aid and of useful 
lessons for the 'developing' countries: since 
they were 'developed', it could be assumed 
that they already had a unified approach or did 
not need one. According to other approaches to 
a unified approach, the 'develped' countries 
were part of the problem, not part of the solu-
tion. Their people needed transformations in 
their style of development just as much as did 
the rest of the world, and might find such 
transformations even harder to achieve, in view 
of their material and psychological investments 
in existing patterns of production and con-
sumption. The people of the rest of the world 
needed to free themselves from their econom-
ic, political, and cultural domination, and from 
the disastrous example of their patterns of arti-
ficially stimulated consumption, technological 
recklessness, and environmental devastation. 
The contacts of the project with the Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe, however, hard-
ly touched on such questions. The facet of the 
unified approach of most interest here was that 
of informational enlightenment: the devising 
of development indicators and 'social account-
ing' to supplement the partially discredited 
GNP and national accounts, in national situa-
tions in which statistics were abundant, rela-
tively reliable, and capable of providing an-
swers to new questions which presumably in-
cluded that of the relation between economic 
growth and human welfare. 
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VI 
The dilemmas of international policy-oriented 
research and lessons for the future 
The preceding pages have focussed on a few 
manifestations of the international aspiration to 
shape the future that, over the past three de-
cades, has generated hundreds of meetings and 
hundreds of thousands of pages of documenta-
tion. On the margins of the ceaseless activity 
generated by the cycles of meetings of the in-
ternational agencies one finds an even more 
diverse and complex ferment of theorizing, 
empirical research, polemics and ideological 
proselytizing whose practitioners interact with 
and contribute to the international normative-
prescriptive efforts but scorn their ritualism, 
utopianism, evasiveness and lack of scientific 
rigour. 
If the project did not manage to prescribe a 
"unified approach to development analysis and 
planning", and in fact concluded that this, 
taken literally, was not a meaningful objective, 
it did make more explicit than heretofore cer-
tain dilemmas that any international policy-
oriented research project would have to face. It 
also suggested that such dilemmas could not be 
avoided within the context of such a project. If 
policy-oriented research were to make any 
contribution to human welfare it would have to 
recognize a permanent tension and ambiguity 
in the demands made on it, and maintain a 
critical attitude towards its own terms of ref-
erence and the suppositions underlying them. 
A mandate to reconcile the irreconcilable 
has at least the virtue of reproducing conditions 
somewhat similar to those of policy-making in 
real national societies. The most likely out-
come may be evasion, but this, is not the only 
possible result. Presumably such an outcome 
can be guarded against by bringing contradic-
tions out into the open and incorporating them 
into the hypotheses of the research: a course 
that should present fewer drawbacks and dan-
gers for a team pursuing policy questions at the 
international level than for advisers to national 
political regimes. 
What are the dilemmas and tensions that 
international policy-oriented research must 
learn to live with? 
First, there is the tension between the 
ideal of explicit definition of basic concepts, 
hypotheses and value premises and the pres-
sures towards a combined electicism and con-
sensualism that the heterogeneity of the situa-
tions confronted seems to legitimate. It cannot 
be accidental that the interminable discussions 
of development have left intact the confusion 
between development conceived as empirical-
ly observable processes of change and growth 
within social systems and development as 
progress toward the observer's version of the 
Good Society. In the first sense development 
can be evaluated positively or negatively or 
judged inherently ambiguous in its implica-
tions for the human future. In the second sense 
development is by definition desirable. Nor 
have the discussions overcome the confusion 
between development conceived as a process 
subject to uniform laws and development con-
ceived as a wide range of possible real patterns 
and possible aspirations. Can the term 'devel-
opment' in the last analysis be anything more 
than a symbolic stamp of approval for changes 
that the user of the term considers unavoidable 
or desirable? 
The unified approach project tried to de-
limit what was to be approached through the 
legitimation of different styles of development 
responding to a minimum criterion of accept-
ability and viability, but this left room for 
argument that practically any combination of 
policies that any regime cared to defend would 
eventually meet the criterion. It would be as 
easy to defend a strategy of immediate struc-
tural transformation, egalitarian distribution 
and self-reliance, at the short-term expense of 
levels of investment, production and consump-
tion, as it would be to defend a strategy of 
maximization of investment and growth in pro-
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duction, at the short-term expense of highly 
inequitable distribution, dependence on for-
eign capital, and repression of protests. 
International policy-oriented research will 
have to continue to struggle to define develop-
ment, along with other concepts, more clearly 
in terms of its own needs, but in full awareness 
that no definition will satisfy all users or pre-
vent overloading of the term as a simultaneous 
expression of the real and of the desirable. 
Second, there is the related tension be-
tween the ideal of arriving at a comprehensive 
and coherent theory explaining the phenom-
ena the research confronts and aspires to 
change, and the pressures toward incongruous 
marriages of the pragmatic and the universal. 
Theories of development and social change 
have proliferated in recent years, but the ex-
planatory power and prestige of all of them has 
waned. The unified approach project was able 
neither to make a reasoned choice among the 
theories already current nor to construct an 
original theory. It confronted —in addition to 
the obvious hindrances of inadequate time and 
disciplinary and other divergences in the 
team— an inhibiting prejudice against theo-
rizing in the institutional sponsors of the proj-
ect. Theoretical argument is divisive, and 
moreover, according to oft-repeated views in, 
United Nations policy-making bodies, it is a 
luxury that cannot be afforded in view of the 
urgency of the problems demanding solution. 
Theoretical explanations are already available 
or can be dispensed with. The recurrent super-
ficiality or evasiveness of the generalizations 
in United Nations documents, seeking to stay 
within the limits of the permissible, confirms 
this evaluation. The policy-making bodies thus 
call for the 'concrete' and the 'practical', but 
with the implicit or explicit proviso that the 
concrete and practical prescriptions must re-
frain from judging specific national situations 
and policies. Thus the compilers of reports 
must aim at prescriptions that appear concrete 
but are general enough to be applicable by any 
government that chooses to listen. The result 
has been a long series of Secretariat responses 
to demands for 'practical' solutions to urgent 
problems that were forgotten as soon as pre-
sented. This was true of the 'practical applica-
tion' proposals deriving from the unified ap-
proach project. However, as was noted above, 
the project resisted advancing very far along 
this path. 
The well-worn retort that nothing is more 
practical than a good theory comes to mind, but 
does not take one far towards resolution of 
the tension. Probably international policy-
oriented research will continue to be more a 
consumer than a producer of theories, and will 
have to open itself to the possible validity, 
under defined conditions, of a wide range of 
theoretical challenges to the relevance of the 
'practical'. 
Third, there is the tension between the 
ideal of searching criticism of the conventional 
wisdom on development and the insertion of 
the research into a complicated array of institu-
tions and expectations deriving from this wis-
dom, at a time when the wisdom itself has 
practically lost whatever coherence it once 
had. Policy-oriented research is expected to 
come up with something new and to criticize 
the old. There would be no occasion for it if its 
sponsors thought that existing diagnoses and 
policies were satisfactory. The very urgency 
with which 'practical' prescriptions are de-
manded indicates a pervasive sentiment of 
crisis. 
Criticism must thus apply itself to a contra-
dictory mixture of conventional suppositions 
(particularly on the role of the State), of 
sweeping, and apparently radical 'new' objec-
tives —popular participation, elimination of 
poverty, satisfaction of basic needs, etc. and of 
terminological innovations giving an air of 
novelty to policies that have long been current. 
The 'unified approach' itself began mainly as a 
terminological innovation for a desideratum 
previously labelled 'balanced social and eco-
nomic development'. 
The most useful corrective will probably 
be the cultivation of historical awareness. The 
history of development as a mobilizing myth is 
short, but long enough for the observation that 
"those who forget history are condemned to 
repeat it" to have become very pertinent. 
The quest for a unified approach to devel-
opment in terms of norms and prescriptions has 
been carried as far as it profitably can be, if not 
farther. The most hopeful direction for the next 
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stages of policy-oriented research lies at levels 
between the comprehensive theoretical or 
ideological explanations for societal change, 
and the local manifestations of change and po-
licies designed to influence change. Compara-
tive studies with a historical perspective fo-
cussed on the ways in which different social 
agents of change perceive their roles and act, 
and the confrontation between their percep-
tions and the specific settings on which they 
are trying to act, are still few. Presumably re-
search in this direction will leave something 
intact in the aspiration for rationally planned 
action to bring social change and economic 
growth into closer correspondence with certain 
generally accepted values of human welfare, 
equity, and freedom. In all probability, how-
ever, it will replace the image of the State as a 
rational, coherent, and benevolent entity 
—capable of choosing and entitled to choose a 
style of development; so powerful but so un-
imaginative that it seeks generalized advice 
and then acts on it— by a more realistic frame of 
reference for policy-oriented interpretation of 
what the State does or evades doing, why, and 
how. 
